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SEPARATION, SUPREMACY, AND THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL RATIONAL BASIS TEST
JOSEPH S. DIEDRICH*
ABSTRACT
When using a judicial tool known as the rational basis test, courts up-
hold a federal or state statute as constitutional so long as the statute ration-
ally relates to a legitimate government interest.  In this Article, I
contribute a new theory to a growing body of scholarship questioning the
validity of the rational basis test.  I argue that the test violates the structural
separation of powers and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Article III of the Constitution vests federal courts with the “judicial
power.”  This power entails applying law to decide particular disputes; in-
terpreting the law in order to apply it; and, when faced with multiple con-
flicting sources of law, applying higher-order law and rendering lower-
order law void or unenforceable.  On that last point, the Supremacy
Clause provides that the Constitution prevails over contrary federal and
state statutes.
I argue that when they deploy the rational basis test in cases challeng-
ing statutes, courts abdicate part of their judicial power and duty.  Instead
of fully exercising the judicial power to ascertain the best, fairest, and cor-
rect interpretation of the constitutional provision at issue, they merely set
a zone of deference, within which all rational interpretations reside.  The
abdicated judicial power is effectively transferred to Congress or the state
legislature (as the case may be), which then exercises the remnant judicial
power—much like how Chevron deference results in transfer of judicial
power to the executive branch.  When used to review a federal statute, this
framework violates the separation of powers.  And when used to review any
statute, it subverts the Supremacy Clause’s established legal hierarchy by
elevating the status of lower-order statutes and illegitimately demoting the
Constitution.
* Appellate Attorney, Husch Blackwell LLP, Madison, Wisconsin. J.D.,
University of Wisconsin, summa cum laude, Order of the Coif.  Special thanks to
Philip Hamburger, Jeffrey Jackson, Kirsten Atanasoff, Kevin LeRoy, Clark Neily,
Alex Phillips, and Yue Zhang for their comments, critiques, and support.  All
opinions are mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION
THE Constitution is law, and “[i]t is emphatically the province andduty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”1  Not what the
law rationally might be.  And not what Congress or any state legislature
says it is.
As part of the New Deal-era reaction against Lochner v. New York2 and
its ilk, the United States Supreme Court developed a now-familiar frame-
work to review the constitutionality of many types of government action:
the “rational basis test.”  Under that test, if a federal or state statute ration-
ally relates to a legitimate government interest, then a federal court (or a
state court applying federal law) blesses it as consistent with the United
States Constitution and applies it to resolve the case at hand.
In this Article, I argue that the modern rational basis test—irrespec-
tive of the outcomes it produces—is unconstitutional.  I am hardly the first
person to say so.  The Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy devoted an
entire symposium to the proposition.3  Randy Barnett has argued that “a
two-tier treatment of constitutional rights violates both the plain and origi-
nal meaning of the Ninth Amendment,”4 which states that unenumerated
rights should not be “den[ied] or disparage[d].”5  Clark Neily has argued
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. See generally Evan Bernick, Subjecting the Rational Basis Test to Constitutional
Scrutiny, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347 (2016).
4. Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1496 (2008); see
also Randy Barnett, Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical, 19 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 845, 858 (2012) [hereinafter Barnett, Judicial Engagement]; Randy E.
Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5,
12 (2012); Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test:
Saving Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 45 U.
RICH. L. REV. 491, 548 (2011); Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Ra-
tional Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 898, 914 (2005) [hereinafter Neily, No Such
Thing] (“The Ninth Amendment says that unenumerated rights should neither be
denied nor disparaged.  But it is hard to imagine how one could more thoroughly
‘disparage’ a constitutional right than to appoint as its sole guardian the rational
basis test.  The Supreme Court should have the courage either to expressly disavow
economic liberties—and accept whatever consequences might flow from explicitly
rejecting centuries of common law, overturning over one hundred years of prece-
dent, and repudiating a core value of the founding fathers—or else devise a test
for protecting those rights that contains some measure of integrity.”).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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that the rational basis test raises due process6 and equal protection7 con-
cerns.  Jeffrey Jackson has argued that the test violates the Constitution by
permitting arbitrary legislation.8  Still others have assailed the rational ba-
sis test on other constitutional and policy grounds.9
This Article contributes a new theory of the rational basis test’s consti-
tutional shortcomings: I argue that the test violates the separation of pow-
ers and the Supremacy Clause.  Particularly given several Justices’ renewed
interest in enforcing the separation of powers and related doctrines,10 this
Article’s theory may prove especially timely and relevant.
To understand the basic contours of my claim, consider first the sepa-
ration of powers.  Building on intellectual foundations laid by liberal polit-
ical philosophy, and reacting to negative experiences with accumulated
power, the Constitution creates three separate branches of the federal gov-
6. See Neily, No Such Thing, supra note 4, at 907–08 (“It is a bedrock principle
of common law that parties to court proceedings are entitled to a neutral adjudica-
tor who is free from bias and even the appearance of bias.  Indeed, so fundamental
is that principal that the Supreme Court considers it an indispensable requirement
of due process.  But like so many of our most cherished legal traditions, that one
goes right out the window in rational basis cases, where judges are not only permit-
ted but required to assist the government in defending challenged regulations by
dreaming up possible justifications of their own.” (footnotes omitted)); see also
Clint Bolick, The Proper Role of “Judicial Activism,” 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5–6
(2019) (“[A]n individual who possesses a right under the Constitution walks into
the courtroom, and the government walks into the courtroom, and the scales of
justice tilt in favor of the government.  Instead of simply interpreting the individ-
ual’s right against the government power on equal terms, a presumption of the
statute’s constitutionality forces the individual to prove what is, in some instances,
a metaphysical impossibility.” (footnote omitted)); Randy E. Barnett, Why Popular
Sovereignty Requires the Due Process of Law to Challenge “Irrational or Arbitrary” Statutes,
14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 355 (2016).
7. Clark Neily, Litigation Without Adjudication: Why the Modern Rational Basis
Test Is Unconstitutional, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 537, 551 (2016) [hereinafter
Neily, Litigation] (“[T]he rational basis test is applied inconsistently, with some
litigants receiving the meaningful, truth-seeking version of the test reflected in
such well-known ‘rational basis with bite’ cases as Cleburne, Moreno, and Romer, while
others receive the rubber-stamp version that virtually assures the law will be upheld
regardless of its true ends or the means used to advance them.”).
8. Jeffrey D. Jackson, Classical Rational Basis and the Right to Be Free of Arbitrary
Legislation, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 509 (2016) [hereinafter Jackson, Classi-
cal] (“[T]he modern rational basis test fits this bill for one simple reason; it allows
arbitrary legislation.  It gives legislation not actually reasonably related to a legiti-
mate governmental purpose the status of positive law.  This is contrary to one of
the most fundamental tenants of American constitutionalism, which is that laws
must not be unreasonable.”).
9. See, e.g., Aaron Belzer, Putting the “Review” Back in Rational Basis Review, 41
W. ST. U. L. REV. 339, 389 (2014); Richard A. Epstein, Rational Basis Review and
FDA Regulation: Why the Two Do Not Mix, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417 (2016);
Joseph Landau, Broken Records: Reconceptualizing Rational Basis Review to Address “Al-
ternative Facts” in the Legislative Process, 73 VAND. L. REV. 425 (2020); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Medium Rare Scrutiny, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 397 (1998).
10. See infra notes 131 (non-delegation doctrine), 160; see also, e.g., Seila Law v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (holding that federal agency’s
structure violated the separation of powers).
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ernment and vests each branch with a distinct power.  This tripartite divi-
sion is both simple and profound: Congress exercises will; the President
and executive branch exercise force; and courts exercise judgment.  Be-
cause separation fosters individual liberty, the Constitution prohibits any
branch from encroaching onto another’s power or from abdicating its
own power and transferring it elsewhere.
Second, consider the judicial power.  The Constitution vests the fed-
eral courts with the “judicial power.”11  Although undefined, this phrase’s
meaning derives from a rich history and a voluminous jurisprudential exe-
gesis.  It contains three critical components.  The first is the power to ap-
ply law (general rules of conduct) to adjudicate particular disputes.  The
second is the power, in the course of adjudicating disputes, to interpret
the law and to ascertain its best, fairest, and correct meaning.12  The third
is the power and duty to decide in accord with higher-order law when mul-
tiple sources of law conflict.  Together with the separation of powers, the
judicial power and duty authorize what is commonly known as judicial re-
view—of all government action, including federal and state legislative
enactments.
Third and finally, consider the Supremacy Clause.  Article VI of the
Constitution establishes a legal hierarchy by designating certain sources of
law—the Constitution and federal statutes “made in Pursuance” of it—
supreme.13  To that end, the Supremacy Clause provides that federal law
prevails over contrary state law.  And it provides that the Constitution
prevails over federal statutes not “made in Pursuance” of it.  All this to-
gether means that the Supremacy Clause informs judges how to discharge
their judicial duty: when a state or federal statute is contrary to the Consti-
tution, the latter prevails to the exclusion of the former.
The rational basis test disturbs all three constitutional principles.
When a party challenges a federal statute as contrary to the Constitution,
the judicial power—vested solely in the courts—would entail fully ascer-
taining the best, fairest, and correct meaning of the lower-order federal
statute and of the higher-order constitutional provision.  If they are indeed
contrary to one another, then the constitutional provision renders the stat-
ute unenforceable, at least in that particular case.  But that’s not what hap-
pens under the rational basis test.  Instead of exercising the judicial power
to fully interpret the best, fairest, and correct meaning of the constitu-
11. U.S. CONST. art. III § 1.
12. I use the phrase “best, fairest, and correct meaning”—or some close vari-
ant of it—throughout this Article.  Case law and secondary sources have used the
terms “best,” “fairest,” “right,” or “correct” (or some combination of those terms)
roughly interchangeably to describe an interpretation of law that is definite and
that results from a court’s independent judgment.  I use the phrase “best, fairest,
and correct meaning” to indicate that basic idea, as clarified or adorned by con-
text.  Although I realize the phrase “best, fairest, and correct” might seem (and
might even be) redundant or contradictory, I ask you to bear with me: it will make
sense based on the existing authorities.
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI § 2.
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tional provision at issue, courts stop short.  They ask only whether Con-
gress acted rationally in enacting the statute.  In so doing, courts
effectively transfer part of the judicial power to Congress, substituting
Congress’s interpretation of the Constitution in a particular case.  This
violates the separation of powers.  And it also subverts the Supremacy
Clause’s legal hierarchy, illegitimately raising the status of federal statutes
and diminishing the status of the Constitution.
No less troubling, rational basis review of state statutes leads to similar
problems.  Although the same federal separation-of-powers concerns do
not arise, abdication and transfer still occur—this time, the transfer of ju-
dicial power is to another sovereign.  And it magnifies the Supremacy
Clause flaw: although scholars have argued about how that Clause applies
to federal statutes, everyone concurs that it clearly limits state power and
clearly authorizes judicial review of state action.
If my arguments about the rational basis test sound at least vaguely
familiar, there’s a reason why: jurists and scholars have been launching
similar attacks against Chevron14 deference for years.  Courts apply Chevron
deference when a party challenges an administrative rule (adopted by an
executive-branch agency) as inconsistent with a statute.  If the statute is
ambiguous, Chevron instructs courts to refrain from fully ascertaining the
best, fairest, and correct meaning of the statute—and to instead ask
merely if the administrative rule amounts to a permissible construction.
Although there are many arguments critical of Chevron deference, one in
particular attacks the doctrine as violating the separation of powers.  By
deferring to the executive branch’s interpretation of law in a particular
case, the argument goes, courts abdicate and transfer part of the judicial
power.  I offer this argument as an analogy.  After all, both Chevron defer-
ence and the rational basis test are used when a party argues that a lower-
order law (administrative rule or statute, respectively) conflicts with a
higher-order law (statute, Constitution, respectively).
In Part I of this Article, I set forth the basic contours of the rational
basis test.  To provide context, I trace its history back to a precursor in the
late 1800s, through its introduction as a reaction against Lochner-era juris-
prudence, and through its maturation in modern Supreme Court case law.
I also explain how the rational basis test permeates a wide range of con-
temporary jurisprudence and is used to evaluate the constitutionality of
vast swaths of government action, particularly federal and state statutes.
As explained, my ultimate goal in this Article is to show that the ra-
tional basis test is inconsistent with certain constitutional principles and
provisions.  I devote Part II to discussing those principles and provisions:
the separation of powers, the “judicial power” vested in the federal courts
under Article III, and the Supremacy Clause.  For each, I provide textual,
contextual, and historical detail necessary to understanding what the pro-
visions and principles mean and how they inform my ultimate argument.
14. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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In Part III, I present the Chevron-deference analogy.  I explain what
Chevron deference is and how it is used.  I review judicial and scholarly
arguments asserting that Chevron deference violates the separation of pow-
ers by requiring courts to abdicate judicial power and transfer it to the
executive branch. I also add that this framework subverts the Supremacy
Clause’s established legal hierarchy.
Part IV comprises my main argument.  In brief, I argue that when
applying the rational basis test, federal courts abdicate judicial power and
transfer it either to Congress (when federal statutes are under review) or
to state legislatures (when state statutes are under review).  The first vio-
lates the separation of powers; both violate the Supremacy Clause.  This
line of argument borrows directly from the well-known constitutional ar-
guments against Chevron deference.
Further, in Part V, I address several likely counterarguments.  Finally,
I offer some concluding thoughts.
I. THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST
Under the modern constitutional-law superstructure that emerged
from the watershed decision in United States v. Carolene Products15 and its
famous fourth footnote,16 courts review government action—including
legislation—using a tiered-scrutiny framework.17  On the one hand, stat-
utes burdening certain rights or creating certain classifications receive
strict or otherwise heightened judicial scrutiny. On the other hand, the
default (and least scrutinous) standard of review is rational basis scru-
tiny18—a test “enormously deferential to the government” that “only
rarely” results in “the Supreme Court invalidat[ing] laws.”19  The rational
basis test instructs a court to uphold a federal or state statute if it is ration-
15. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
16. Id. at 152 n.4 (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution . . . .”); see Jack M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83
NW. U. L. REV. 275, 282–93 (1989).
17. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional
(and Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 401–02 (2016); Jackson, Classical,
supra note 8, at 507–08.  Although generally accepted, this “hornbook” model of
judicial scrutiny, Suzanna Sherry has argued, “has not fully reflected the actual
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (or lower courts) in decades.”  Suzanna
Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism: Defending Carolene Products, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 559, 561 (2016).  “Instead, the Court has essentially adopted a sliding scale,
under which the level of governmental justification needed to sustain a challenged
law depends on the strength of the presumption of constitutionality.” Id.
18. Several commentators have noted that courts inconsistently formulate the
rational basis test and, in turn, have argued that the rational basis test is actually a
collection of multiple tests. See, e.g., Neily, Litigation, supra note 7, at 539–40; see
also Robert C. Farrell, Equal Protection Rational Basis Cases in the Supreme Court Since
Romer v. Evans, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 456 (2016) [hereinafter Farrell,
Equal Protection]; Sherry, supra note 17, at 560; Paulsen, supra note 9.
19. Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 401–02; see also Farrell, Equal Protection,
supra note 18, at 442 (noting low success rate of challenges subjected to rational
7
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ally related to any legitimate government interest or purpose.20  “[T]he
government’s objective only need be a goal that is legitimate for the gov-
ernment to pursue,” and that goal “need not be the actual purpose of the
legislation, but rather any conceivable legitimate purpose.”21
The modern, canonical rational basis test is defined by two cases: Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical22 and Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Com-
munications, Inc.23 Williamson involved an Oklahoma statute mandating
that only licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists—not opticians—
could fit, duplicate, or replace eyeglass lenses.  The lower court held that
the statute was protectionist and “deprive[d] opticians of their right to
freely pursue a lawful calling,”24 but the Supreme Court saw things differ-
ently.  Without any evidentiary support, the Court surmised that the
Oklahoma legislature “might have” concluded the statute was necessary to
protect the public health.25  Although the Oklahoma statute admittedly
could “exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases,” the Court
reasoned that it “need not be in every respect logically consistent with its
aims to be constitutional.”26  “It is enough that there is an evil at hand for
correction, and that it might be thought”—again, even without evidentiary
basis—“that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct
it.”27
The Beach Court doubled down on Williamson’s deference while re-
viewing a federal statute exempting some, but not all, cable television facil-
ities from regulation.  Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas
reiterated Williamson’s implication that a statute passes constitutional mus-
ter so long as “any reasonably conceivable state of facts . . . could provide a
rational basis for” it.28  Expanding on how to implement the test, the
Court explained that “those attacking the rationality” of a law must “nega-
tive every conceivable basis which might support it,” and that “a legislative
choice . . . may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence
basis review); Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 370 (1999) (same).
20. Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 401.
21. Id. at 401–02 (first citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981);
then citing U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980)).
22. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
23. 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
24. Lee Optical v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 136 (W.D. Okla. 1954), rev’d,
348 U.S. 483 (1955). See generally Barnett, Judicial Engagement, supra note 4.
25. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487.
26. Id. at 487–88.
27. Id. at 488 (emphases added).
28. Beach, 508 U.S. at 313; see also U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174
(1980) (quoting Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78–79 (1911))
(“[W]hen the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of
facts at the time that the law was enacted must be assumed.”).
8
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or empirical data.”29  Presaging subsequent scholarly criticism, Justice Ste-
vens opined in concurrence that “judicial review under the ‘conceivable
set of facts’ test is tantamount to no review at all.”30
This modern, canonical rational basis test, forged from Carolene Prod-
ucts and crystallized in Williamson and Beach, is the subject of this Article.
Yet both for context and to fulfill intellectual curiosity, it is worth noting
that neither Williamson nor Carolene Products created the rational basis test
from whole cloth.  Although the term “rational basis” was certainly in the
legal lexicon before Carolene Products,31 the “more commonly used test” in
the pre-Carolene era searched for a “reasonable” basis.  Despite sharing sim-
ilar phraseology and other similar features,32 the modern rational basis
test “is not the same as the pre-1937 reasonable basis test.”33
Used in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the classical reasonable basis
test, rooted primarily in conceptions of balance between traditional state
29. Beach, 508 U.S. at 315; see also id. (“[B]ecause we never require a legisla-
ture to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for consti-
tutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction
actually motivated the legislature. . . .”); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)
(“A State . . . has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a
statutory classification . . . .  A statute is presumed constitutional . . . and ‘[t]he
burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every con-
ceivable basis which might support it . . . .’” (second alteration in original) (cita-
tions omitted) (quoting Lenhausen, 410 U.S. at 364))); Minnesota v. Cloverleaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (“[Challengers] must convince the court
that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not
reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.” (quoting
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979))); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
426 (1961) (“A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”).
30. Beach, 508 U.S. at 323 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
31. See, e.g., Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935);
James M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Rational Basis Test and Why It Is So Irrational: An
Eighty-Year Retrospective, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 762 (2018) [hereinafter McGold-
rick, Jr., Retrospective].
32. Jackson, Classical, supra note 8, at 497.
33. McGoldrick, Jr., Retrospective, supra note 31, at 762.  Courts arguably still
apply the reasonable basis test in certain limited situations, including cases involv-
ing the fundamental rights of prisoners, content-neutral regulation of speech,
searches of students by teachers and school officials, and classifications based on
illegitimacy. See id. (first citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987); then citing
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); and
then citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985); Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259, 265 (1978)).  Courts sometimes also deploy a more rigorous rational
basis test, often referred to as rational basis with “bite.” See id. (citing Jeremy B.
Smith, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge
Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2774 (2005)); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32
(1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447–48
(1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61, 63 (1982); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
9
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police power and federal constitutional constraints,34 undertook a more
searching review of at least state legislative action.  In most cases, courts did
not uphold legislation based on “conceived” or speculated facts—but in-
stead examined reality.  “If . . . a statute purporting to have been enacted
to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no
real or substantial relation to those objects,” the Supreme Court pro-
nounced in 1887, “it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby
give effect to the Constitution.”35
Even though “far more legislation was upheld than struck down”
under the reasonable basis test,36 many criticized the test as insufficiently
deferential to legislative will.37  One prominent critic was Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., who through the lens of broad judicial restraint em-
braced “the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.”38  Dis-
senting in Lochner, for instance, Holmes opined that
the word “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man neces-
sarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fun-
damental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law.39
The full Court eventually got on the Holmesian bandwagon.  “The
modern rational basis test,” Jeffrey Jackson has observed, “purports to be a
correction to what are perceived to be the excesses of the Court (and also
lower courts) during the first three decades of the 1900s.”40  The pur-
ported correction shines brightly in the Williamson Court’s triumphant
proclamation that “[t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
34. Jackson, Classical, supra note 8, at 497. See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 45–60, 64–75 (1993).
35. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887). But see Lindsley v. Nat. Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (“[I]f any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts . . . must be
assumed.”).
36. Jackson, Classical, supra note 8, at 499; Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law,
Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943, 944 (1927) (“[T]he Court
had decided under the due process clause ninety-eight cases involving substantive
legislation of a social or economic character, and in only six of these did the Court
hold the legislation unconstitutional.”); Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the
United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 295 (1913) (“Examination of
. . . 560 cases [decided between 1887 and 1911] conclusively proves that the al-
leged evil in the trend of the Court is a purely fancied one; for out of these 560
cases there are only two cases . . . in which any State law, involving a social or
economic question of the kind included under the phrase ‘social justice’ legisla-
tion, has been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.”).
37. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER 40–55 (2011).
38. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
see Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 243–56 (1964).
39. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
40. Jackson, Classical, supra note 8, at 500.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory
of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improv-
ident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”41 William-
son “adopted Holmes’s rational basis test as the standard”42 and in turn
“render[ed] the precise coordinates” of legislative judgment “virtually
unreviewable.”43
As a purported correction to perceived overzealous judicial policing
of economic regulation (epitomized by Lochner), the modern rational ba-
sis test is most often used to review federal and state statutes regulating or
prohibiting economic conduct.  The Supreme Court has “made clear” that
when “ordinary commercial transactions are at issue, rational basis review
requires deference to reasonable underlying legislative judgments.”44  To
that end, the Court has employed the deferential rational basis test to re-
view federal and state economic legislation under the due process and
equal protection guarantees of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.45  It has also used the test in regulatory takings cases46 and to re-
view statutes for consistency with the Commerce Clause.47
41. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); see also Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731–32 (1963) (“We refuse to sit as a ‘superlegislature to
weigh the wisdom of legislation,’ and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time
when courts used the Due Process Clause ‘to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought.’” (first quoting Day-Bright
Lighting, Inc., v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); then quoting Williamson, 348 U.S.
at 488)).
42. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE
COURT’S HISTORY AND THE NATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIAL 155 (2015).
43. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 316 (1993); see also William-
son, 348 U.S. at 488 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877) (“For pro-
tection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not the
courts.”).
44. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 680 (2012) (quoting United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)).
45. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541 (2012) (upholding provisions
of federal Social Security Act allegedly violating equal protection); Armour, 566
U.S. 673 (upholding city sewer assessment allegedly violating equal protection);
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (2003) (upholding Iowa
taxation scheme, which taxed racetrack slot-machine revenue differently from
riverboat slot-machine revenue, over equal-protection challenge); Williamson, 348
U.S. 483 (upholding Oklahoma law allegedly violating due process and equal pro-
tection); Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (upholding federal law allegedly violating
due process).
46. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)) (“When the legisla-
ture’s purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear
that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the
wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in
the federal courts.” (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43
(1984))); see also Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (holding that “the exercise of . . . eminent
domain power” will be upheld if it “is rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose”).
47. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down federal statute
on Commerce Clause grounds, albeit only arguably applying the rational basis
11
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Yet the Supreme Court has also applied the rational basis test beyond
the economic context.  Generally speaking, the test is used whenever a
statute implicates neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification.
In Vacco v. Quill,48 for example, the Court applied the rational basis test to
uphold a New York statute banning assisted suicide.49  Similarly in Central
State University v. American Association of University Professors,50 the Court ap-
plied the test to uphold an Ohio workload-requirement statute designed
to increase public-university faculty members’ weekly teaching hours.51
And in Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach,52 the District of Columbia Circuit ap-
plied the test to uphold an FDA regulation prohibiting the sale of certain
experimental drugs to terminally ill patients.53  Although this Article fo-
cuses primarily on legislative action, the Supreme Court has also applied
the test to other forms of government action.  Recently in Trump v. Ha-
waii,54 for example, plaintiffs challenged a presidential proclamation re-
stricting entry of certain foreign nationals into the United States, alleging
that it violated the Establishment Clause.  The Court applied the rational
basis test and upheld the proclamation.55
test); Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 (upholding federal law under the Commerce
Clause).  With respect to the Commerce Clause, “[l]aws that intentionally or
facially discriminate against outsiders or against interstate commerce are subject to
strict scrutiny, while those that are facially neutral are subject to minimal scrutiny.”
Sherry, supra note 17, at 560.  In Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion, the Supreme
Court’s rational basis test in Commerce Clause cases differs from its test in equal-
protection and due-process cases; whereas in the latter the Court requires only
conceivable facts, in the former the Court requires a showing of actual empirical
facts. See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 151–54 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“The rational basis referred to in the Commerce Clause context is a
demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical demonstration.  While undoubtedly
deferential, this may well be different from the rational basis test as Lee Optical
described it.”).
48. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
49. Id. at 808–09.
50. 526 U.S. 124 (1999).
51. Id. at 128.  Although the majority opinion omits any discussion of a stan-
dard of review, many consider United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), to be
a rational basis case. See Farrell, Equal Protection, supra note 18, at 452–55. Windsor
struck down part of the federal Defense of Marriage Act and was “based entirely on
the fact that the challenged classification seeks to advance an impermissible pur-
pose—animosity toward a particular group.  The Court made no attempt to con-
sider other permissible purposes that the law might have advanced.” Id.
52. 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
53. Id. at 712–13; see also, e.g., Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc.,
139 S. Ct. 1780, 1781–82 (2019) (holding that state abortion regulation was sup-
ported by a rational basis); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)
(holding that no rational basis existed for village’s demand of a 33-foot easement
from plaintiff to connect her house to the public water supply, but only a 15-foot
easement from other property owners).
54. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
55. Id. at 2420–23.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
In this Article, I ultimately argue that the rational basis test, as de-
scribed above, is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution.  This Part dis-
cusses the constitutional provisions and principles underlying my ultimate
argument.  First, I explain the Constitution’s structural separation of pow-
ers, including the historical backdrop that led to its adoption.  Second, I
explain what one of the three constitutionally separated powers—the “ju-
dicial power,” vested in the federal courts—means and entails.  Third, I
discuss the Supremacy Clause, which establishes the primacy of federal law
over state law and the U.S. Constitution over all contrary law.
A. Separation of Powers
Western philosophy and political theory have long recognized three
types of human power, exercisable by both individuals and collectives: will,
force, and judgment.56  These powers find political expression as legisla-
tive power, executive power, and judicial power, respectively.  In most gov-
ernments throughout history, at least two—and often all three—of those
powers have been amalgamated in single actors or bodies.  Against that
backdrop, John Locke lamented that “it may be too great a temptation to
human frailty, apt to grasp at [p]ower, for the same persons who have the
[p]ower of making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute
them.”57
From Ancient Greece through Blackstone’s England and beyond, phi-
losophers and political theorists have recognized that “[a] government of
diffused powers . . . is a government less capable of invading the liberties
of the people.”58  No single person has had more influence in expounding
and popularizing separation-of-powers theory than the French philoso-
pher Montesquieu.59  He was arguably the first, and certainly the most
prominent, theorist to articulate the importance of a tripartite division of
authority.60  Separating will from force and both from judgment became
56. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 326–28 (2014)
[hereinafter HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL].
57. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 143 (1764),
reprinted in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 119, 194 (Thomas I. Cook ed. 1947).
58. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gor-
such, J., concurring); see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Bal-
ance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 488–89 (1989).
59. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in the Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions
and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 213 (1989) (describing Montesquieu as
“the most frequently cited” theorist of the separation of powers); Farina, supra note
58, at 488–90 (discussing Montesquieu’s influence on Founding Era separation-of-
powers thought).
60. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency In-
terpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 645 n.163 (1996) [hereinafter
Manning, Constitutional Structure] (citing WILLIAM B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 101–02 (1965)).
13
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understood as “essential to the preservation of liberty”61 and the promo-
tion of the rule of law62—or, as Philip Hamburger has helpfully stressed,
rule under and through law.63
Philosophical developments advocating for the separation of powers
were paralleled by political events demanding such separation.  These par-
allels appeared first in revolutionary England as a reaction against the
Crown’s prerogative courts.  They later continued in revolutionary
America as a reaction against the Crown generally and colonial and early
state legislatures specifically.64  The U.S. Constitution was (and is) seen as
an attempt to rectify pre-constitutional excesses and liberty deprivations
resulting from incomplete separation.65
Borrowing heavily from Montesquieu—who Madison called the “ora-
cle” of separation-of-powers philosophy66—the Framers wrote at length
about the separation of powers.  As Publius, Madison captured the con-
temporaneous (and timeless) angst “that power is of an encroaching na-
ture.”67  “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,” he subse-
quently added, “may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyr-
anny.”68  With strident confidence, Madison concluded: “No political
truth is . . . stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of
liberty” than the separation of powers.69
To that end, the Framers “built into the tripartite Federal Govern-
ment . . . a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggran-
61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 318 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.
1961); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  The separa-
tion of powers also protects liberty and guards against arbitrary governance by ef-
fectively requiring three branches to concur on the legitimacy of a government act.
See, e.g., Raymond M. Kethledge, Hayek and the Rule of Law: Implications for
Unenumerated Rights and the Administrative State, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 193, 212
(2020) (“The more important protection, instead, is the requirement that any par-
ticular act of coercion have the concurrence of three branches.”).
62. See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 60, at 645–47; see also
M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 66, 102–06
(1967); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
434 (1987).
63. See HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 56, at 7.
64. See id. at 323–54; Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 60, at
640–42; see also FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM 143–83 (1985); 2
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 73, 74 (Max Farrand ed. 1966)
(July 21, 1787) (remarks of James Madison) (“Experience in all the States had
evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vor-
tex.”); id. at 76 (Gouverneur Morris “concurred in thinking the public liberty in
greater danger from Legislative usurpations than from any other source.”).
65. See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 60, at 645–46 n.165.
66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 61, at 301 (James Madison).
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 61, at 305 (James Madison).
68. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 61, at 298 (James Madison); see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 61, at 305–09 (James Madison); The FEDERALIST
NO. 51, supra note 61, at 317–21 (James Madison).
69. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 61, at 298 (James Madison).
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dizement of one branch at the expense of the other.”70  The “very
structure” of the Constitution vests each of three branches of the federal
government with distinct powers.71  First, the Constitution vests Congress
with “the legislative power.”72  With this power of will, Congress “com-
mands the purse” and “prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights
of every citizen are to be regulated.”73  Second, vested with “the executive
power,”74 the President “dispenses the honors” and “holds the sword of
the community.”75  Third and finally come the federal courts, in which the
Constitution vests “the judicial power”76 to “interpret[ ] the law and ap-
ply[ ] it retroactively to resolve past disputes.”77  Built on Montesquieu
and necessitated by historical experience, the Constitution’s tripartite or-
ganization “exemplifies the concept of separation of powers”78 and, in so
doing, “diffuses power the better to secure liberty.”79
Because of the separation of powers’ importance for safeguarding lib-
erty,80 Justice Joseph Story considered it a “maxim of vital importance that
the three great powers of government . . . forever be kept separate and
distinct.”81  Although interest in patrolling inter-branch separation has
waxed and waned over the nation’s 250-year history, the Supreme Court
70. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997) (alteration in original) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)).
71. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 946 (1983)); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559
(1992). Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, with id. art. II, and id. art. III.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I.
73. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 61, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).
74. U.S. CONST. art II.
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 61, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton). See
generally Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 701.  “In the late-eighteenth century,” when the Constitution was ratified,
“someone vested with the executive power and christened as the chief executive
enjoyed the power to control the execution of law.” Id. at 819.
76. U.S. CONST. art. III.
77. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gor-
such, J., concurring).
78. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 946 (1983)); see also Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–30
(1935) (“So much is implied in the very fact of the separation the powers of these
departments by the Constitution . . . .”).
79. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
80. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers in general was not merely to
assure effective government but to preserve individual freedom.”); supra notes
57–69 and accompanying text.
81. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 519, at 2–3 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co., 1833).  None of the branches,
Madison stressed, “ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence
over the others, in the administration of their respective powers.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 48, supra note 61, at 305 (James Madison).
15
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has repeatedly recognized both the legal and political gravity of the Con-
stitution’s structural separation.82
B. “Judicial Power”
Article III of the Constitution places the federal judicial power in the
hands of the federal courts: “The judicial power of the United States, shall
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish.”83  Nowhere does the
Constitution define “judicial power,” thus raising the question: what, ex-
actly, is it?
The answer begins with what judicial power is not.  Given the struc-
tural separation of powers implied by the Constitution’s text and history,
judicial power must differ from legislative power (will) and executive
power (force).  Bereft of both will and force, the judicial power captures
the third form of human power: judgment.84  Broadly speaking, then, the
judicial power can be thought of not as the power of will, and not as the
power of force, but rather as the power to exercise judgment.
Likely the single most famous American expression of the judicial
power comes from Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v.
Madison.85  In identifying the judicial power with its holder, the judicial
branch, Marshall explained that “[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”86  Without more,
however, one might dismiss that statement as begging the question—or
worse, Clintonian wordplay.87  Yet the power—the “province and duty”—
to “say what the law is” very neatly captures the essence of the judicial
power.
The power to “say what the law is” includes three interrelated, but
conceptually separable, elements.  First, with the judicial power, courts ex-
ercise judgment to apply law (often general rules of conduct in the form
of legislation) to particular disputes.  Second, as a necessary part of doing
so, courts interpret what the law means.  Third, courts resolve conflicts
82. “[S]itting atop the judicial branch, this Court has always carried a special
duty to ‘jealously guar[d]’ the Constitution’s promise of judicial independence.
So we have long resisted any effort by the other branches to ‘usurp a court’s power
to interpret and apply the law to the circumstances before it.’”  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139
S. Ct. 2400, 2438 (2019) (Gorsuch, J. concurring) (second alteration in original)
(footnote omitted) (first quoting Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323
(2016); then quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 60 (1982) (plurality opinion)).  Regarding waxing and waning patrolling, see,
for example, Ronald J. Krotoszynski & Atticus DeProspro, Against Congressional Case
Snatching, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 791, 812–17 (2021).
83. U.S. CONST. art. III §1.
84. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 61, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton).
85. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
86. Id. at 177.
87. President Bill Clinton once told a grand jury: “It depends upon what the
meaning of the word ‘is’ is.”  H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310, at 176 (1998).
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between multiple conflicting sources of law.  Each one of these elements
of judicial power may initially sound unremarkable and even unnecessary
to mention.  Although they are ingrained and assumed in modern Ameri-
can public and legal consciousness, they nevertheless each bear significant
meaning, as the balance of this Section expounds.
Whereas the legislative power of will entails the authority to establish
rules of conduct generally and prospectively, the judicial power of judg-
ment entails the application of those general rules to specific parties in
particular disputes.88  Likewise, whereas the executive power entails the
use of physical force, the judicial power includes only the power of judg-
ment—which, in turn, can be carried into effect by an executive actor.89
As a natural and unavoidable consequence of applying general rules
to specific cases, courts exercising judgment must also interpret the rules’
meanings.  Chief Justice Marshall explained this in Marbury, stating that
“[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule.”90  The judicial power, then, necessarily includes
the power and duty to interpret the law.  Moreover, because the federal
judicial power belongs to the courts and is separated from the other
branches, “[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar prov-
ince of the courts.”91  As Justice Thomas recently reiterated, “the judicial
power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its indepen-
dent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.”92
Interpreting and expounding upon the laws entails deciding on
meaning, resolving ambiguities, and ultimately reaching conclusions—on
a case-by-case basis—about the best, fairest, and correct meaning of the
law.  By exercising their power of independent judgment, courts in any
given case must ascertain the “best and fairest” interpretation of the law.93
Even though close cases exist and reasonable judges may disagree, courts
88. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gor-
such, J., concurring).
89. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 61, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton)
(“The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direc-
tion either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active
resolution whatever.  It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but
merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm
even for the efficacy of its judgments.”).
90. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
91. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 61, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton).  The
judicial power “belongs to [judges] to ascertain . . . the meaning of any particular
act proceeding from the legislative body.” Id.
92. Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 691 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575
U.S. 92, 119 (2015) (Thomas, J. concurring)).
93. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2429–30 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring);
accord, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152, 1155–56 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  By
the same token, ascertaining the best, fairest, and correct interpretation of the law
in a particular case does not mean the court determines a law’s meaning and appli-
cability in all cases.
17
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nevertheless are entrusted to “reach conclusions about the meaning of stat-
utes, rules of procedure, contracts, and the Constitution,” and indeed, all
sources of law.94  “[N]o matter how closely balanced the question may seem
to be,” Justice Antonin Scalia once wrote, “[t]he judicial task, every day,
consists of finding the right answer.”95
One can envision this judicial task of interpretation graphically.  In
Figure A below, the solid horizontal line represents all possible interpreta-
tions of a law or legal text.  In a particular case, a court exercises judicial
power to ascertain the best, fairest, and correct interpretation; doing so is
a process of convergence into a single meaning in a particular case.  This
process is represented by converging dotted lines, and that result is repre-
sented by a “line of correctness.”
FIGURE A
Court exercising Judicial Power
Line of Correctness
(Best, Fairest, Correct Interpretation)
All Possible Interpretations
Sometimes, of course, a law might be ambiguous or vague.  Fully fa-
miliar with ambiguity, the Framers “understood the judicial power to in-
clude the power to resolve these ambiguities,”96 and “the interpretation of
legal texts, even vague ones, remained an exercise of core judicial
power.”97  No less than with unambiguous laws, “[c]ourts were expected”
to apply such vague or ambiguous laws, clarifying their meaning “over
time as they applied their terms to specific cases.”98  Just because a law is
ambiguous or vague, in other words, does not alter the nature of the judi-
cial power or place it in the hands of a different branch.
94. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2430 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
95. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (1989).
96. Baldwin, 140 S. Ct. at 691 (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (quoting Perez, 575 U.S. at 119 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
97. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1249 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see id. at 1232 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135
S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 88 (Garland Publ’g 1978) (1765); Philip
Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239,
303–10 (1989) [hereinafter Hamburger, Accommodation].
98. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1250 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (first citing
Hamburger, Accommodation, supra note 97, at 303–10; then citing Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 526 (2003)).
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Although I return to this theme throughout the balance of the Arti-
cle, it is worth briefly commenting now on the interaction of the judicial
power and the separation of powers.  By vesting a particular branch with
the judicial power, the Constitution communicates that other branches
may not exercise the judicial power.  For instance, Congress has no au-
thority to conclusively interpret the statutes it enacts or to adjudicate cases,
outside of making new laws.99  Nor does the President have either power.
To be sure, the political branches may tailor their actions to conform with
the Constitution; their individual officers must do so to uphold their con-
stitutional oath.  That said, the courts invariably act as final arbiter of the
law’s meaning.  “[I]t is not to be forgotten,” Justice Joseph Story empha-
sized, “that the [J]udicial [D]epartment has imposed upon it by the consti-
tution, the solemn duty to interpret the laws, in the last resort.”100  No
matter how “disagreeable that duty may be,” Story added, the separation
of powers demands that even in cases where a court’s “own judgment shall
differ from that of other high functionaries,” the court “is not at liberty to
surrender, or to waive” its duty or its judicial power.101  “[A] permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system” is that “the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”102
99. See generally Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018); United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
100. United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. 141, 162 (1841) (Story, J.) (emphasis
added).
101. Id.
102. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922–23 (1995) (quoting Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)).  Indeed, it is a “basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that prin-
ciple has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.” Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18; see
also, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–05 (1974); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549
(1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also infra notes 260–65 and
accompanying text.  “Madison and his contemporaries expected the practice that
developed under the Constitution to ‘liquidate and settle the meaning’ of . . .
contestable [constitutional] provisions.”  Nelson, supra note 98, at 527 (quoting
Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 LETTERS OF
MADISON 143, 145); THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 61, at 490 (Alexander Ham-
ilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 61, at 224–25 (James Madison).  On the
one hand, even Madison thought liquidation of meaning was not necessarily lim-
ited to judicial liquidation.  On the other hand, just because other branches may
play a role in expositing the law over time does not change the judiciary’s power
and duty to exercise independent judgment and to fully ascertain meaning in par-
ticular cases. See Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra, at 143 (“I
have always supposed that the meaning of a law, and . . . of a constitution, so far as
it depends on judicial interpretation, was to result from a course of particular deci-
sions, and not those from a previous and abstract comment on the subject.”). But
cf. Nelson, supra note 98, at 597 (noting how “various commentators have sug-
gested that members of the political branches should play a greater role in liqui-
dating at least some of the Constitution’s indeterminacies than members of the
federal judiciary”); Frank Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
349, 374–75 (1992) (“If the age or generality of the text frustrates the statement of
a rule, then it also defeats the claim of judicial power.  If the living must indeed
19
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As just quoted, Justice Story referred to the federal judiciary’s “duty.”
So too did Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury, stating that “[i]f two laws
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each.”103  Judicial power, it has been long accepted, implies judicial
duty.104  “[W]hen the Constitution authorized judicial power, it took for
granted that judges, by their nature,” have a “duty” to “exercise indepen-
dent judgment in accord with the law of the land.”105  The judicial duty,
which “accompanies judicial power,”106 includes everything already dis-
cussed, as well as one more critical component.  In addition to ascertain-
ing meaning, the judicial power and its concomitant duty require courts to
resolve conflict between multiple applicable sources of law.
English law long understood the judicial power to impose a duty to
decide in accord with higher law.107  Indeed, “[s]ince classical and early
Christian times, it had been suggested that acts were lawful only if they
conformed to superior law.”108  English lawyers were fully “[a]ccustomed
to thinking about law within a hierarchy, and to understanding this hierar-
chy as the primary source of legal obligation,” and, to that end, “could not
help but be aware that a superior law determined the lawfulness of an
inferior law and thus might render it unlawful and therefore void.”109
Recognizing and respecting a hierarchy of law is endemic to the judicial
power and judicial duty.  Where multiple sources of law apply in a given
case and those sources conflict, the judicial power entails—and the judi-
cial duty requires—deciding in accord with the higher-order law.
The power and duty to decide in accord with higher-order law forms
the basis of what is now referred to as judicial review.  “Judicial review,” as
Philip Hamburger has put it, “is entailed by judicial duty.”110  Despite what
many believe, judicial review was neither an American invention nor a
power grab by the Marshall Court.  It was rather a “broader phenomenon
than commentators on its history have recognized,” resting not necessarily
on any particular constitutional provision but rather “in the context of
general assumptions about law and judicial duty—about the hierarchical
character of law and the duty of judges to decide in accord with law.”111
In exercising their power of judgment to apply law to adjudicate cases, for
chart their own course, then the question is political, outside the domain of judi-
cial review.”).
103. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
104. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008) [herein-
after HAMBURGER, LAW].
105. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 56, at 312.
106. Id.
107. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97.
108. Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 9
(2003) [hereinafter Hamburger, Judicial Duty].
109. Id. at 12.
110. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 56, at 312.
111. Hamburger, Judicial Duty, supra note 108, at 2. See generally HAMBURGER,
LAW, supra note 104; HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 56.
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example, English courts in the Middle Ages began to review lower-order
law for consistency with higher-order law.  And it was “[o]n the basis of
their duty to decide in accord with law and their assumptions about the
hierarchical character of law” that these courts “reviewed government
acts.”112  In particular, those courts long possessed the power to review
Crown action for consistency with English constitutional law—and to de-
clare the former void where it violated the latter.113
One thing English courts did not have the authority to do, however,
was review Parliamentary legislation for consistency with the English Con-
stitution.  Yet that lack of authority had nothing to do with the nature or
definition of judicial power.  It rather resulted from the organizational
structure of English government and which bodies held which parts of the
judicial power.  Parliament was both the highest legislative body and the
highest judicial body.  English inferior courts lacked power to review Par-
liamentary acts, because Parliament as high court (the House of Lords) had
already effectively passed on the constitutionality of its statutes by enacting
them in its dual role as high legislator.
Although the meaning of “judicial power” in America derives directly
from English tradition and history, the exercise of that power differs in
America.  “After 1776, American judges,” following their English fore-
bears, “continued the practice of evaluating acts for their lawfulness.”114
The “judicial power” vested in the federal courts carries the same meaning
as the “judicial power” generally understood in English law for centuries:
the power and duty to decide cases in accord with law, including the
power to review lower-order law for consistency with higher-order law.  In
1803, Chief Justice Marshall called it “the very essence of judicial duty” to
decide which of two conflicting laws governs in a particular case.115
But unlike the organization of government in England, the U.S. Con-
stitution organizes the American federal government differently.  Instead
of combining high court with high legislature, the Constitution separates
the courts from Congress completely and vests the judicial power in the
former but not the latter.116  Because of the tripartite separation of pow-
ers, exercising the judicial power in America also includes the power to
review statutes:117
112. Hamburger, Judicial Duty, supra note 108, at 40.
113. Id. at 12–17.
114. Id. at 18.
115. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
116. See Hamburger, Judicial Duty, supra note 108, at 22.  Hamburger also con-
siders it critically important to the distinction between English and American gov-
ernment that “American constitutions were express acts of the people.” Id. at 21.
117. See id. at 22–23.  Although Article III vests the judicial power in
“[c]ourts,” judges matter for this analysis, too:
There were layers to the judges’ obligation to perform this duty.  To some
extent, the obligation, like the duty, followed from the office, but unlike
the duty, the obligation arose principally from the oath by which judges
qualified for their office.  More remotely, to the extent their office was
21
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What changed in America was not the invention of judicial re-
view (which had been commonplace since at least the Middle
Ages), nor even judicial review under a constitution (which was
understood from at least the seventeenth century), nor even judi-
cial review of legislation (which was familiar from the review of
corporate and colonial acts).  Instead, what was new in America
was review under express constitutions and especially the review
of the legislation of sovereign states.  Otherwise, however, there
was much continuity—most generally in the old assumption that
an act could not lawfully violate a superior law and that judges
were obliged by their office and their oaths to decide in accord
with law.118
Contrary to popular belief, then, neither the U.S. Constitution nor Mar-
bury invented judicial review or altered the judicial power or judicial
duty.119  Instead, the American difference in the exercise of judicial power
resulted from the Constitution’s tripartite structure, meaning “judges now
were free and even obliged to review legislative acts.”120
defined by law and their oaths were imposed by law, the judges could be
considered legally obliged to decide in accord with law, and therefore
judicial review could be described in terms of the judges’ own legal du-
ties.  Most generally, to the extent judges had a duty to decide in accord
with law, they were thereby bound by law, and presumably it was in this
sense that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution recited that
state court judges were “bound” by federal law.  Judges, however, typically
were too cautious simply to say that in making their decisions, they were
bound by law—perhaps because they hesitated to describe their duties in
a manner that might seem to suggest that a judge’s error amounted to a
violation of law.
Id. at 24. (footnote omitted).
118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. at 26; see also HAMBURGER, LAW, supra note 104, at 1–2.  In addition to
Hamburger’s extensive historical evidence of judicial review, Randy Barnett has
also explained how, as an original interpretive matter, “judicial power” includes
the power of judicial review of government action, both executive and legislative.
See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Judicial Power, 12 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 115, 117 (2004) [hereinafter Barnett, Judicial Power]; see also Saikrishna B.
Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887 (2003).
Exhaustively chronicling Founding Era evidence of meaning, Barnett has con-
cluded that “the original meaning of the ‘judicial power’ in Article III, included
the power of judicial nullification.”  Barnett, Judicial Power, supra, at 117.
The evidence from the Constitutional Convention and from the state rati-
fication conventions is overwhelming that the original public meaning of
the term “judicial power” included the power to nullify unconstitutional
laws.  In contrast, because the “executive power” did not include the in-
herent power to veto legislation, it had to be added expressly.
Id. at 138.
120. Hamburger, Judicial Duty, supra note 108, at 26.
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C. Supremacy Clause
The preceding Section explains how the judicial power entrusts
courts with a duty to respect legal hierarchies; when lower-order law con-
flicts with higher-order law, the latter prevails.  So, what is the hierarchy of
law?  The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution supplies answers:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.121
As its text lays bare, this clause sets forth what sources of law constitute the
“supreme Law of the Land.”  That supreme law consists of: (a) the U.S.
Constitution, (b) certain statutes, and (c) certain treaties.122  Federal stat-
utes are “Laws of the United States.”  Not all federal statutes (Laws of the
United States) qualify as supreme law; only those Laws of the United States
“made in Pursuance” of the U.S. Constitution achieve supreme status.
This Article refers to such supreme statutes as “LOTUS-MIP.”
The Supremacy Clause thereby establishes—or at least confirms—the
legal hierarchy (1) between federal and state law, and (2) among different
sources of federal law.  First, it elevates certain federal law above contrary
state law.  By conscripting state judges to obey federal supreme law “not-
withstanding” state law “to the Contrary,” the Supremacy Clause ranks su-
preme law—including the U.S. Constitution and LOTUS-MIP—higher
than contrary state constitutions and other sources of state law, including
state statutes.
Second, the Supremacy Clause elevates certain federal law above
other federal law.  The U.S. Constitution and LOTUS-MIP reign supreme.
This means, quite obviously, that the Constitution and LOTUS-MIP rank
above federal administrative rules, which are not statutes (much less LO-
TUS-MIP).  It also means, perhaps less obviously, that the Constitution
ranks higher than all contrary statutes.  If a law of the United States is
“made in Pursuance” of the Constitution, then, by definition, it is consis-
tent with the Constitution—and no question of hierarchy is presented.
On the other hand, if a law of the United States is not “made in Pursuance”
of the Constitution, then it does not qualify as supreme, and it ranks below
the Constitution.  To be “made in Pursuance,” a statute must comply with
the Constitution’s procedural and substantive requirements123—and,
121. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
122. Treaties are not relevant to this Article.
123. See Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal
Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 93–115 (2003); see also HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL,
supra note 56, at 404–08; THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 61, at 197–201 (Alex-
ander Hamilton).  After all, as Bradford Clark has observed, “[i]f all ‘Laws’ en-
acted by Congress qualified as ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ then Congress and
23
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hence, the Constitution prevails over federal statutes that fall short either
procedurally or substantively.124
In setting forth these two hierarchies, the Supremacy Clause “upholds
the written Constitution as the highest form of federal law”125 and pro-
the President could effectively amend the Constitution by ordinary legislation.
This would contradict the spirit, if not the letter, of Article V, which establishes
precise procedures to govern constitutional amendments.”  Clark, supra, at 114.
Still, some scholars have rejected that view, contending instead that “made in
pursuance” requires only procedural propriety. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1, 9
(2d ed. 1986) (“[I]t fully meets all else that is compelling in the language of the
clause simply to conclude that the proviso that only those federal statutes are to be
supreme which are made in pursuance of the Constitution means that the statutes
must carry the outer indicia of validity lent them by enactment in accordance with
the constitutional forms.  If so enacted, a federal statute is constitutional.”); see also
John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L.
REV. 333, 346 n.48 (1998) (“At the least, that phrase alludes to the Article I, § 7
process, so that the clause applies only to those writings that have been duly
adopted.”); William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 1, 20 (“The phrase ‘in pursuance thereof’ might as easily mean ‘in the manner
prescribed by this Constitution,’ in which case acts of Congress might be judicially
reviewable as to their procedural integrity, but not as to their substance.”).  David
Currie and others have suggested that the phrase “made in pursuance” was “meant
to distinguish those made under the Articles of Confederation.” DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888
72–73 (1985); see also Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court
Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (2001) (“‘In Pursuance thereof’ means ‘after,’
not ‘consistent with.’”).
More broadly, some scholars have rejected the idea that the Supremacy
Clause contemplates any hierarchy among federal sources of law.  Larry Kramer,
for example, has said that “the Framers clearly decided to adopt judicial review as a
device for controlling state laws,” but that “the power of courts to review federal
legislation was left unaddressed.”  Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 61, 67 (2001).
124. What’s more, the Supremacy Clause’s two separate hierarchies (federal
over state, and U.S. Constitution over certain federal) interact: by “condition[ing]
the supremacy of federal ‘Laws’ on their being ‘made in Pursuance’ of the Consti-
tution,” the Supremacy Clause also mandates that courts “prefer federal statutes to
contrary state law only if the statutes themselves fall within the scope of Congress’
enumerated powers.”  Clark, supra note 123, at 100.  This interaction was on dis-
play in two of the Supreme Court’s most celebrated cases: McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
McCulloch is known for upholding the statute creating the Bank of the United
States and rejecting Maryland’s ability to assess a state tax on the Bank’s opera-
tions. McCulloch thus upheld the primacy of federal law over state law. McCulloch,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 425–36.  But in the course of reaching those conclusions, the
McCulloch Court also first explained that the Bank statute would be supreme—and
hence, preemptive of contrary state law—only if it had been enacted in pursuance
of the constitution, which the Court held it had been. See id. at 405–11.
In Gibbons, likewise, the Court was faced with a conflict between a federal stat-
ute and a state statute.  The Court was careful, however, to not automatically as-
sume that the federal statute prevailed simply because of its federal nature.
Rather, the Court first took time to address whether the federal statute was “made
in pursuance” of the Constitution, such that it qualified for supreme status above
contrary state law. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 190–94, 210–11.
125. Clark, supra note 123, at 113–14.
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vides a foothold in the Constitution’s text to fully implement the princi-
ples of judicial review and judicial duty discussed above.  Background
principles alone may have implied what the Supremacy Clause spells out:
the U.S. Constitution is supreme above all federal and state law to the
contrary.  With this hierarchical framework in place, federal judges are
enabled to discharge the judicial power and duty with clarity.
And that is precisely what Chief Justice Marshall did in Marbury, a case
highlighting the interaction between the judicial power and the
Supremacy Clause.  In the course of deciding a particular dispute between
Marbury and Madison, Marshall observed that both a federal statute and
the U.S. Constitution supplied applicable law, but also that they conflicted.
First, Marshall recalled the judicial power and its concomitant duty.  “If
two laws conflict with each other,” he wrote, “the court must determine
which of these conflicting rules governs the case.”126  He stressed that this
task “is of the very essence of judicial duty.”127  Second, to fulfill this judi-
cial duty, Marshall turned to the Supremacy Clause.  “[I]n declaring what
shall be the supreme law of the land,” Marshall noted that “the constitution
itself is first mentioned” and that “not the laws of the United States gener-
ally” rank supreme, “but those only which shall be made in pursuance of
the constitution, have that rank.”128  Reasoning from major premise (the
judicial duty privileges higher-order law over contrary lower-order law)
through minor premise (the Supremacy Clause elevates the U.S. Constitu-
tion above statutes), Marshall declared the Constitution “and no[ ] such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply” because the
Constitution is “a superior, paramount law.”129  Ultimately, Marshall con-
cluded that “the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to
all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void;
and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.”130
III. CHEVRON DEFERENCE: THE ANALOGY
In this Part, I offer an analogy that will lay additional foundation for
my constitutional critique of the rational basis test.  Much like how parties
assert that lower-order federal and state statutes violate the higher-order
U.S. Constitution, parties also argue that lower-order federal administra-
tive rules violate higher-order federal statutes.  To evaluate the latter
claim, federal courts rely on Chevron deference, a judicially created test for
determining whether an administrative rule violates a statute.  As many
readers likely already know, jurists and scholars have argued that the test
126. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 178 (1803).
127. Id. at 178.
128. Id. at 180.
129. Id. at 177–78.
130. Id. at 180.
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violates the separation of powers.  By reviewing Chevron deference and the
separation-of-powers argument against it, as well as by showing how Chev-
ron subverts the Supremacy Clause, I provide an appetizer-by-analogy
before serving up this Article’s entrée.
A. Challenging Administrative Rules
The modern federal executive branch contains many administrative
agencies.  By statute, Congress has delegated certain legislative power to
agencies to adopt administrative rules (also known as regulations) that,
like statutes, establish generally applicable rules of conduct.131  Agencies
then enforce those rules.  In most cases (albeit sometimes after a lengthy
administrative review process), a party adversely affected by an agency’s
enforcement (or threatened enforcement) of a rule can seek review of the
agency’s action in federal court.132
As part of that judicial review of administrative action, parties often
challenge the administrative rule itself.  These challenges implicate the hi-
erarchy of laws. Although LOTUS-MIP rank “supreme” under the
Supremacy Clause, administrative rules are not statutes at all, much less
LOTUS-MIP.  They rank lower than LOTUS-MIP.  A party challenging an
administrative rule thus essentially argues: both the rule and a statute gov-
ern the conduct at issue, but those two sources of law conflict; based on
the judicial duty to privilege higher-order law over contrary lower-order
law and the Supremacy Clause’s elevation of LOTUS-MIP above contrary
administrative rules, the statute governs and the administrative rule—at
least as applied to the conduct at issue—is unenforceable or void.
As explained at length above, the judicial power entails exercising
judgment to apply law in particular cases; interpreting the meaning of law
to ascertain its best, fairest, and correct meaning; and when multiple
sources of applicable law conflict, privileging higher-order law over lower-
131. Under current Supreme Court precedent, Congress has authority to
delegate its constitutionally vested legislative power to the executive branch, so
long as it “lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the per-
son or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to con-
form.”  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (second alteration in
original) (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928))).  A majority of sitting Justices have questioned the continued veracity of
this broad authority to delegate power. See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342
(2019) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari);
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131–42 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting,
joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.); id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s delegation doctrine wholly ignores
how the powers vested in each branch under the Constitution are themselves delega-
tions from the People. See infra note 163. See generally HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL,
supra note 56, at 377–402.
132. The most common vehicle is the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5
U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2018).
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order law.133  To that end, when a party claims that a lower-order law (ad-
ministrative rule) conflicts with a higher-order law (federal statute), a
court must determine whether a conflict actually exists.  To determine
whether a conflict exists, in turn, the court must logically first know what
both sources of law mean; it is not possible to say that laws conflict if their
respective meanings are not known.  The first task in exercising judicial
power, then, includes ascertaining the best, fairest, and correct meaning
of two sources.  Only then will the court be able to evaluate them for ac-
tual conflict; and if conflict exists, the court will apply the higher-order law
and disregard the lower-order law.  This entire process of reasoning is the
essence of judicial power.
Building on Figure A from earlier, the judicial power envisions deter-
mining a line of correctness for both the statute and the administrative
rule.  If the lines match, so to speak, there is no conflict; the court applies





But if the lines deviate, then the judicial power and duty instruct that





This is indeed what happens in many challenges to administrative
rules when the applicable statute is unambiguous.  The court interprets
the rule, it interprets the statute, and if the two conflict, it enforces the
statute and holds the administrative rule unenforceable.  But that is not
what happens when a statute is ambiguous—at least not since the Su-
133. See supra notes 12, 93–95 and accompanying text; see also Marbury, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with each other, the
Courts must decide on the operation of each.”).
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preme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.134
B. Chevron and the Zone of Deference
Chevron featured a challenge to an Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) administrative rule about air-pollution control measures.  The
Clean Air Act, a federal statute, regulates certain conduct regarding
“sources” of pollution but does not define “source.”  In an administrative
rule, the EPA adopted its own definition of “source.”  Challengers asserted
that the administrative rule was inconsistent with the Act.  Writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court, Justice John Paul Stevens announced a now-
familiar framework for evaluating challenges to administrative rules.135
In such a challenge, Chevron announced, a court first asks “whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”136  “If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.”137  This framework is so far consistent with how one would
anticipate a court to exercise the judicial power.  But Chevron then added a
twist:
134. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
For a discussion of the history of judicial review of administrative action, see Aditya
Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908,
927–29 (2017); Scalia, supra note 95, at 512–13.  Some have argued that Chevron
deference was a small step from decades- and centuries-old standards for reviewing
executive action. See Bamzai, supra, at 927–29.  Others, most notably Justice
Thomas, have argued that Chevron’s transfer of power drastically departed from
past practice. See Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 692–94 (2020) (mem.)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  Undertaking a painstaking re-
view of nineteenth and early twentieth century cases, Bamzai has concluded that
Chevron signifies a pronounced departure from the traditional judicial role:
I have traced the origins and development of the doctrine of judicial def-
erence to executive interpretation.  The fundamental payoff of the histor-
ical analysis has been the insight that judicial deference—as an
interpretive theory practiced from the mid-twentieth century onwards
and especially after the Court’s opinion in Chevron—is an innovation.  Al-
though some forms of “respect” for executive constructions did exist in
traditional interpretive methodology, the modern doctrine finds no true
historical antecedent in the nineteenth century, neither in the cases ap-
plying the traditional canons of construction on which Chevron relied, nor
in the cases applying the standard for obtaining a writ of mandamus.
Bamzai, supra, at 1000.  “But the proposition that Chevron has a basis in traditional
interpretive methodology, the views of the Framers of the United States Constitu-
tion, or section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act should be abandoned—
that proposition is a fiction.” Id. at 1001.
135. The Chevron-deference framework applies to all agency interpretations of
statutes with the force of law. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,
587 (2000).
136. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
137. Id. at 842–43.
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[If] Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on
the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an adminis-
trative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or ambigu-
ous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.138
In short, Chevron “announced the principle that the courts will accept an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous terms of a statute
that the agency administers.”139
Under Chevron, instead of exercising independent judgment in the
interpretation of the law to ascertain the best, fairest, and “right answer, no
matter how closely balanced the question may seem to be,”140 courts exer-
cise merely a portion of the judicial power.  They exercise judicial power
only up to the point at which all remaining possible interpretations of a
statute are “permissible”141 or “reasonable.”142  After that conceptual junc-
ture, the executive branch exercises judicial power up to the point of con-
clusively determining meaning.
Of course, just because multiple permissible interpretations exist does
not mean they are equally valid.143  Yet a court applying Chevron deference
accepts an agency’s interpretation of a statute as controlling, even if it is
not, in the court’s view, the best, fairest, or correct interpretation.  The
court “does not simply impose its own construction on the statute,”144 nor
does it adopt “even the reading [it] would have reached if the question
initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”145
Returning again to graphical renderings, a court interpreting a LO-
TUS-MIP (higher-order law) under Chevron does not establish a line of
correctness delineating the best, fairest, and correct interpretation of that
law.  It instead sets a zone of deference within which all permissible inter-
pretations reside—including among others the best, fairest, and correct in-
terpretation.  And then the court stops.  This does not mean, however,
that the statutory line of correctness ceases to exist or that the judicial
power stops being exercised just because it stops being exercised by a
court.  As Figure D shows, the court exercises judicial power from the out-
set up to the zone of deference.  Picking things up from there, the executive
branch administrative agency then exercises the remnant judicial power
138. Id. at 843.
139. Scalia, supra note 95, at 511.
140. Id. at 520.
141. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
142. E.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2124 (2016);
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009); United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001).
143. Scalia, supra note 95, at 520.
144. Id. at 512 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
145. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11.
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from the boundary of the zone of deference up to its own substitute line of
correctness, thereby conclusively saying what the law is.
FIGURE D
Line of Correctness








Executive exercising Judicial Power
So, instead of evaluating whether the lower-order administrative rule
is consistent with or contrary to the best, fairest, and correct interpretation
of the higher-order LOTUS-MIP (by comparing their respective lines of
correctness, as shown above in Figures B and C), the court only goes so far
as to determine whether the administrative rule lies within the statute’s
zone of deference. Chevron deference then equates the statutory line of
correctness with whatever the agency adopted in its rulemaking process—
so long as the agency did so within the zone of deference (see Figure E).
Because the administrative agency both writes the administrative rule and
dictates the substitute line of correctness, the administrative rule—once





To illustrate by example, consider City of Arlington v. Federal Communi-
cations Commission.146  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires state
and local governments to act on wireless siting applications “within a rea-
sonable period of time after the request is duly filed.”147  The Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), the agency charged with administer-
ing the Act, determined that “reasonable period of time” means presump-
tively (but rebuttably) 90 days to process a collocation application and 150
146. 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
147. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2018).
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days to process all other applications.  Relying on Chevron, the Fifth Cir-
cuit—and ultimately the Supreme Court—concluded that this interpreta-
tion was reasonable, and hence the FCC’s administrative rule controlled.
But neither court ever said that the FCC’s rule was consistent with the best,
fairest, and correct meaning of the Telecommunications Act.  In the ab-
sence of Chevron, a court might reach the same conclusion after fully exer-
cising the judicial power and ascertaining statutory meaning—or it might,
for instance, determine that “reasonable period” is a case-specific inquiry
dependent on the totality of the circumstances.  The point is that the
Court did not conclusively determine statutory meaning; the FCC did.
And because the Court reached the point of concluding that the FCC’s
interpretation was within the zone of deference—permissible and reasona-
ble, but not necessarily the best, fairest, or correct interpretation148—it
stopped exercising judicial power.  The FCC then effectively exercised ju-
dicial power from the border of the zone of deference up to the point of
adopting the 90/150-day rule, which the Court then accepted and applied
as a substitute line of correctness.
C. Constitutional Problems with Chevron Deference
Chevron deference has been the object of many scholars’ and jurists’
ire.  Criticisms of Chevron have come from all corners, some grounded in
policy, some in statutory law, and some in the Constitution.149  Here, I
148. “Best and fairest” is borrowed from Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opin-
ion in Kisor v. Wilkie, a case about the related Auer deference doctrine, under
which courts in certain circumstances defer to agencies’ interpretations of their
own regulations.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concur-
ring).  Although Auer bears resemblance to Chevron, and although the criticisms
launched against both doctrines are similar, courts still treat them differently.
Concurring in part in Kisor, Chief Justice John Roberts took pains to announce:
“Issues surrounding judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regu-
lations are distinct from those raised in connection with judicial deference to
agency interpretations of statutes enacted by Congress.  I do not regard the Court’s
decision today to touch upon the latter question.” Id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., con-
curring in part) (citation omitted).
149. For example, some have argued that Chevron deference contravenes the
Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690,
692 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Gutierrez-
Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring);
The Chevron Doctrine: Constitutional and Statutory Questions in Judicial Defer-
ence to Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Reg. Reform, Commercial &
Antitrust Law of H. Comm. on Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2016) (statement of John F.
Duffy, Professor of Law, Univ. of Va.), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/
20160315/104665/HHRG-114-JU05-Wstate-DuffyJ-20160315.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q6ZG-8PA3]; Bamzai, supra note 134, at 985–94.  Some have criticized
Chevron on administrability and policy grounds. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Chev-
ron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731
(2014); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779 (2010).  Some
have raised due-process concerns. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gor-
such, J., concurring) (“Transferring the job of saying what the law is from the
judiciary to the executive unsurprisingly invites the very sort of due-process (fair
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focus on one of those constitutional critiques: the tension between Chevron
and the structural separation of powers.  In so doing, I also comment on
the interplay between Chevron and the Supremacy Clause.
As explained above, the judicial power entails “say[ing] what the law
is”150 by ascertaining the best, fairest, and correct151 interpretation of law
and applying that law to adjudicate particular disputes.  “[A]s originally
understood,” the judicial power requires courts to exercise “independent
judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws,” “including am-
biguous ones administered by an agency.”152  Under Chevron, however, a
court exercises only a part of the judicial power.  Judges still decide
whether a statute is ambiguous and whether the agency’s view is permissi-
ble.  Yet “where in all this does a court interpret the law and say what it
is?”153
The remnant judicial power—that portion beyond merely evaluating
the range of permissible or reasonable interpretations (setting the zone of
deference) up to the point of fully ascertaining a statute’s meaning in a
particular case—still exists, of course.  But under Chevron, courts do not
exercise it, prompting then-Judge Gorsuch to call the doctrine “no less
than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty.”154
In applying Chevron deference, not only do federal courts fail to exer-
cise their full judicial power and duty, they abdicate and transfer (or dele-
gate) part of that power to the executive branch.  Rather than interpreting
higher-order LOTUS-MIP up to the line of correctness and refusing to
apply contrary lower-order administrative rules, courts under Chevron
“must allow an executive agency to resolve the meaning of any ambiguous
statutory provision.”155 Chevron deference forces judges to “lay aside” the
full scope of their judicial power and “declare affirmatively” that “the law is
what the agency says it is,”156 often simultaneously “abandon[ing] what
notice) and equal-protection concerns the framers knew would arise if the political
branches intruded on judicial functions.”); Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer
and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 112
(2018) (citing Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1189
(2016)) (relying on Philip Hamburger’s research to argue that “Chevron deference
imbues the federal judiciary with institutional bias in favor of the most powerful
parties (the federal bureaucracy), which violates parties’ due process rights when
their life, liberty, or property is at issue”).
150. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also supra
Section II.B.
151. See supra notes 12, 93–95 and accompanying text.
152. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217–19 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring in judgment)).
153. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2440 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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they believe is ‘the best reading of an ambiguous statute.’”157  In short,
Chevron “wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative authority to ‘say
what the law is,’ and hands” over part of that judicial power and duty to
the executive.158
This is constitutionally problematic, because Article III’s Vesting
Clause vests “every single drop” of the judicial power in the courts—not
elsewhere.159  “[N]ever,” the Supreme Court has warned, “should the ‘ju-
dicial power . . . be shared with [the] Executive Branch.’”160  As Justice
Story expanded, “in cases where [a court’s] own judgment shall differ
from that of other high functionaries,” the court “is not at liberty to sur-
render, or to waive” the judicial power or its concomitant duty.161  But
Chevron deference violates these principles.  Unsurprisingly, several cur-
rent and former Supreme Court jurists have questioned Chevron’s validity
or outright called for its demise.162  So too have many commentators rec-
157. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Nat’l
Cable & Telecomm’ns Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005)).
Christopher Walker has argued that Chevron deference presents separation-of-pow-
ers concerns from yet another angle—by siphoning the legislature’s power.  “The
deference required by Chevron not only erodes the role of the judiciary,” “it also
diminishes the role of Congress.”  Walker, supra note 149, at 112 (quoting Egan v.
Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 279 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring in
the judgment)).  “In particular, Article I vests Congress with ‘All legislative Pow-
ers,’ yet Chevron deference encourages members of Congress to delegate broad
lawmaking power to federal agencies.  In doing so, Congress further frustrates the
values of the nondelegation doctrine.” Id.; see also Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2713
(Thomas, J., concurring); Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 60, at 625.
Finally, Walker has also theorized about potential Article II concerns.  Walker,
supra note 149, at 113–15.
158. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation
omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
159. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2190 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting);
see also Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Such a transfer is in
tension with Article III’s Vesting Clause, which vests the judicial power exclusively
in Article III courts, not administrative agencies.”).  The Constitution provides “no
exception” to the rule that “the judicial power of the United States may be vested
only in tribunals whose judges have life tenure and salary protection.” Ortiz, 138 S.
Ct. at 2190; accord Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138
S. Ct. 1365, 1372–73 (2018); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011); Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 330–31 (1816).
160. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2437 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (second and third al-
teration in the original) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995)).
161. United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 162 (1841) (Story, J.).
162. See Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 691–92 (2020) (mem.)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct.
893, 908–09 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (referring to “the mounting criticism
of Chevron deference,” musing how a party seemingly entitled to invoke the doc-
trine in its favor barely mentioned it and even hated doing so, and concluding that
“this is all to the good”); Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (Because “[t]he proper rules for interpreting statutes and
determining agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord with
constitutional separation-of-powers principles and the function and province of
the Judiciary,” “it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropri-
ate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented
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ognized the tension between Chevron deference and constitutional struc-
ture.163  As John Manning has put it, “If law interpretation ‘is the proper
that decision.”); Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); City of
Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315–16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)) (observing how “[t]he
rise of the modern administrative state has not changed” the fact that it is “emphat-
ically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is,” and
admonishing that the “danger posed by the growing power of the administrative
state cannot be dismissed”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Amanda Riley, Would Kavanaugh Limit the Chev-
ron Doctrine? E&E NEWS (July 10, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/
1060088675 [https://perma.cc/PL39-WQHV] (regarding Kavanaugh).
Although Justice Scalia’s judicial and scholarly writings seem to waffle between
strident support for deference and steadfast rejection of the same, there is little
doubt that Chevron made him at least uncomfortable.  Shortly after Chevron was
decided, Scalia observed that
[i]t is not immediately apparent why a court should ever accept the judg-
ment of an executive agency on a question of law.  Indeed, on its face the
suggestion seems quite incompatible with Marshall’s aphorism that “[i]t
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”  Surely the law, that immutable product of Congress, is
what it is, and its content—ultimately to be decided by the courts—can-
not be altered or affected by what the Executive thinks about it.
Scalia, supra note 95, at 513 (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177).  Although deferring to the views of the govern-
ment or its officers might be a matter of respect, “to say that those views, if at least
reasonable, will ever be binding—that is, seemingly, a striking abdication of judicial
responsibility.” Id. at 514.
Separately, perhaps recognizing the constitutional problems with Chevron,
“[t]he Supreme Court has expressly instructed [courts] not to apply Chevron defer-
ence when an agency seeks to interpret a criminal statute.” Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834
F.3d at 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Abramski v. United
States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2274 (2014)).  As stated by then-Judge Gorsuch, deferring
to an agency’s interpretation of a criminal statute “would violate the Constitution
by forcing the judiciary to abdicate the job of saying what the law is and preventing
courts from exercising independent judgment in the interpretation of statutes.”
Id.
163. Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 60, at 621.  Not only does
abdication and transfer of power—from one branch to another—violate the struc-
tural separation of powers, it also raises other constitutional concerns.  The legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial powers vested in the respective federal branches did
not emerge from the ether; they were initially delegated from the People. See
HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 56, at 377, 380 (“By means of the Constitution,
the people delegate power to the government.  In particular, they delegate a spe-
cialized power to each branch of government . . . .  Delegation was the principle by
which the people established their republic and kept their power superior to that
of their government . . . .”); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116,
2133–34 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREA-
TISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION § 141, at 71
(J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell Oxford 1947) (1689)) (describing problems ac-
companying delegation of legislative power to executive officials).  Being dele-
gated once already, the branches cannot further subdelegate that power by
transferring it elsewhere. See HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 56, at 386
(“[T]he Constitution . . . expressly bars the subdelegation of [vested] powers.”); see
also id. at 377 (“[W]hen [one branch] purports to give its [vested] power to [a
different branch], the question is not whether the principal can delegate the
34
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and peculiar province of the courts,’ why should a court ever decide a case
or controversy based on a reading of the law with which it disagrees?”164
In Marbury’s terms, Chevron limits a court’s exercise of judicial power, mod-
ifying it from saying what the law is to saying what the law could permissi-
bly be.165
Chevron’s transfer of judicial power and corresponding separation-of-
powers violation is not harmless.166  Article III judges exercising judicial
power, but whether the agent can subdelegate it.”); id. at 380–85 (tracing history
of declaring governmental subdelegations unlawful, and concluding that “far from
being a mere doctrine or a mere nicety of political theory, the effect of delegation
in precluding any subdelegation was a foundation of political freedom”). See gener-
ally Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077
(2004).  Well-worn principles of agency law are instructive: a principal may dele-
gate authority to an agent, but the agent may not further subdelegate absent ex-
press permission to do so from the principal. See HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra
note 56, at 386; accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1954).
See generally GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDER-
STANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017).  Otherwise there could be an infi-
nite chain of delegation, with each delegee further and further attenuated from
the original principal.  These principles apply wholeheartedly to condemn the ab-
dication and transfer of judicial power by Article III judges and courts to non-
Article III actors. See HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 56, at 396–98 (discussing
subdeledgation of judicial power specifically); id. at 398 (“In the Constitution, the
people of the United States delegate judicial power to courts composed of judges,
and as evident from the nomination and confirmation process, judges are ap-
pointed for their personal qualities.  The judges therefore cannot transfer their
office, and the courts cannot transfer their power.”); id. at 397 (alteration in origi-
nal) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sir Leoline Jenkins, manuscript
notes in interleaved copy of RICHARD ZOUCHE, CASES AND QUESTIONS OF RIGHT AND
JUDICATURE, RESOLVED IN THE CIVIL-LAW 12ff (1652)) (Our law is that a judge can-
not make a deputy . . . for he is constituted upon presumption of his knowledge
and integrity (qualities personal and not communicable).”).  After all, if “[i]t will
not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribu-
nals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative,” Wayman v. Southard, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825) (Marshall, J.), then how could it be contended that
the federal courts can delegate their judicial power elsewhere?
Separately, Philip Hamburger has also argued that instead of “delegation” and
“non-delegation,” it may be more appropriate to frame issues of inter-branch au-
thority in terms of “vesting” and “divesting.” See Philip Hamburger, Delegating or
Divesting?, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 108–10 (2020).  “[I]n the Constitution,”
after all, “generic nondelegation principle [became] a more specific matter of vest-
ing.” Id. at 108.  The language of “vesting” “speaks more forcefully than prior anti-
delegation theories and does not leave its meaning to be implied from such theo-
ries.” Id.  Ultimately, “because the Constitution vests all legislative powers in Con-
gress, Congress cannot vest any such powers elsewhere.” Id. at 110.  And “Congress
cannot divest itself of the powers that the Constitution vests in it.” Id.
164. Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 60, at 621 (footnote omit-
ted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 61, at 467 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
165. But see, e.g., Henry Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1983) (“[T]he court is not abdicating its constitutional
duty to ‘say what the law is’ by deferring to agency interpretations of law: it is
simply applying the law as ‘made’ by the authorized law-making entity”).
166. Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 691–92 (2020) (mem.)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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power enjoy constitutional safeguards of tenure and salary protection, in-
sulating them from politics and the threat of “human will.”167  Executive
branch officers by design have no such protections; under Chevron defer-
ence, they exercise judicial power without Article III’s safeguards.  “The
Executive is not insulated from external threats, and it is by definition an
agent of will, not judgment.”168  Even if Chevron’s transfer of power and
compromise of structural separation might not be “the very definition of
tyranny,”169 it no doubt raises many of the general concerns that
prompted the Constitution’s tripartite division of powers in the first
instance.170
None of this is to suggest, however, that executive interpretation
might not properly and constitutionally serve as evidence of statutory mean-
ing.171  But “respect[ing] executive interpretations” because “they embod-
ied understandings made roughly contemporaneously with” statutory
enactment differs from accepting them “because they were executive as
such.”172  Indeed, Chevron’s separation-of-powers problem arises not from
deference per se, that “mealy-mouthed word . . . not necessarily meaning
anything more than considering those views with attentiveness and
profound respect.”173  The problem rather arises from binding deference,
the core Chevron notion that a court’s task ends once it concludes that the
agency’s interpretation is permissible and lies within the zone of
deference.174
In addition, by abdicating part of its judicial power and duty, courts
applying Chevron deference also subvert the legal hierarchy set forth in the
Supremacy Clause.  LOTUS-MIP indisputably rank higher than federal ad-
ministrative rules.  Yet by permitting administrative rules to pass without
167. Id.; see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 120 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); HAMBURGER, LAW, supra note 104, at
507, 508.
168. Baldwin, 140 S. Ct. at 691–92 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
169. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 61, at 298 (James Madison).
170. See supra Section II.A.
171. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 336 n.413 (1994) (“I emphatically reject the
view, which sometimes travels under the name of deference, that an interpreter
(typically, a judge) should reach a conclusion different from the one produced by
her best legal analysis, or should refrain from reaching any conclusion at all, be-
cause of the views of another.  While an interpreter may be persuaded or influ-
enced in the exercise of her own judgment by the views and reasoning of another,
any theory that accords decision-altering weight to the views of another, contrary
to the interpreter’s settled conviction as to the proper interpretation of the provi-
sion at issue, is fundamentally illegitimate.”).
172. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2426 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(third internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bamzai, supra note 134, at 943,
962).
173. Scalia, supra note 95, at 514.
174. See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 60, at 617; Scalia, supra
note 95, at 513–14.
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the full scrutiny required by the judicial duty—regardless of whether a
proper exercise of that duty would ultimately uphold or strike down the
administrative rule—courts dishonor the Supremacy Clause’s text and ob-
jective.  They simultaneously bastardize the elevated status of LOTUS-MIP
and illegitimately raise the status of administrative rules.  How far each of
those deviations extends may depend on the particular case—but if the
effect is to equate them, then the result is doubtless a constitutional
violation.
To be sure, not everyone agrees that Chevron deference violates the
separation of powers.  Some have argued that the separation of powers
actually requires Chevron deference.175  When Congress leaves an ambigu-
ity in a statute administrated by an agency, the argument goes, “the resolu-
tion of that ambiguity necessarily involves policy judgment.”176  Because
“[u]nder our democratic system, policy judgments are not for the courts,”
a policy-making branch must interpret and liquidate those ambiguities.177
The language of Chevron itself buttresses this argument and relies on the
principle that the executive branch is more directly accountable to the
electorate than the courts.178  In challenges to administrative rules cen-
tered on a policy-focused ambiguity in statutory language, the Chevron
Court said, “federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices of those who do.”179
In response to the argument that the separation of powers mandates
or supports Chevron deference, at least two immediate counterarguments
arise.  First, as mentioned above, judges regularly confront ambiguous stat-
utes.  They nonetheless find a way to ascertain meaning; that is the core
judicial power to declare what the law “is.”180  There is no apparent reason
why this regular judicial approach to statutory interpretation must change
in cases reviewing administrative rules.  Judges are still capable of fully as-
certaining the meaning of ambiguous statutes even when a lower-order
source of law happens to exist.
Second, as Justice Scalia objected, the traditional statutory-interpreta-
tion toolkit includes making certain policy judgments—not legislative pol-
icy judgments, to be sure, but judicial judgments in the course of
ascertaining statutory meaning.181  For example, “one of the most fre-
175. Scalia, supra note 95, at 514–15; see Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to
Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269,
277–78, 283, 285 (1988). Cf. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron
Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 308, 312 (1986) (arguing that Chevron shifts policy-
making responsibility from courts to democratically accountable officials in
agencies).
176. Scalia, supra note 95, at 515.
177. Id.
178. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66
(1984).
179. Id. at 866.
180. See supra Section II.B.
181. Scalia, supra note 95, at 515.
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quent justifications courts give for choosing a particular construction is
that the alternative interpretation would produce ‘absurd’ results, or re-
sults less compatible with the reason or purpose of the statute.”182  For
Justice Scalia at least, this interpretive tool “unquestionably involves judi-
cial consideration and evaluation of competing policies.”183
IV. WHY THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In the previous Part, I discussed Chevron deference and the arguments
that it violates the separation of powers and the Supremacy Clause.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with them, these arguments have
achieved a level of familiarity in the legal consciousness.  In this Part, I
show how the same constitutional provisions and principles—the separa-
tion of powers, the judicial power, and the Supremacy Clause—work to-
gether similarly to cast doubt on the rational basis test. Chevron deference
departs from the Constitution because courts applying it abdicate their
power and duty to say what the law is.  The rational basis test functions the
same way when the law in question is the Constitution.  As Chief Justice
Marshall famously proclaimed, it is the “province and duty of the Judicial
Department to say what the law is”—not what it rationally could be, and
not what Congress or a state legislature thinks it is.
A. Judicial Review of Statutes
Both Congress and state legislatures enact generally applicable rules
of conduct in the form of statutes.  When parties find themselves subject
to a federal or state statute, they often argue that the statute violates the
U.S. Constitution’s substantive provisions.184  Just like with challenges to
administrative rules, these challenges to statutes implicate the hierarchy of
laws.
First, consider state statutes.  Under the Supremacy Clause, the U.S.
Constitution and LOTUS-MIP rank “supreme,” with state statutes occupy-
ing a subordinate position.  A party challenging a state statute under the
federal Constitution essentially argues: both the state statute and the U.S.
Constitution govern the conduct at issue, but those two sources conflict;
based on the judicial duty to privilege higher-order law over contrary
lower-order law and the Supremacy Clause’s explanation that the U.S.
Constitution ranks higher than state statutes, the Constitution governs and
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. This Article does not address challenges to state statutes based on incon-
sistency with a federal statute or a state constitution.  Nor does this Article address
challenges based on failure to follow constitutional procedure.
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the state statute—at least as applied to the conduct at issue185—is unen-
forceable or void.186
Next, consider federal statutes.  The Supremacy Clause declares the
U.S. Constitution and LOTUS-MIP “supreme.”  At first blush, federal stat-
utes and the Constitution occupy the same level of the legal hierarchy.
But that is not the whole story.  As discussed above, if a federal statute (law
of the United States) is “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution, then, by
definition, it is consistent with the Constitution—and no question of hier-
archy arises.  On the other hand, if a federal statute is not “made in Pursu-
ance” of the Constitution, then it does not qualify as supreme, and it ranks
lower than the Constitution.187  The Constitution, in short, prevails over
contrary federal statutes.  In a challenge to a federal statute, the central
issue is whether the statute is consistent with—in other words, “made in
Pursuance” of—the Constitution.  A party challenging a federal statute
under the Constitution thus essentially argues: both the federal statute
and the Constitution govern the conduct at issue, but those two sources
conflict; based on the judicial duty to privilege higher-order law over con-
trary lower-order law and the Supremacy Clause’s explanation that the
Constitution ranks higher than federal statutes not made in pursuance,
the Constitution governs, and the contrary federal statute—at least as ap-
plied to the conduct at issue—is unenforceable or void.
Challenges to both state and federal statutes, then, similarly implicate
the judicial power and the Supremacy Clause’s hierarchy.  Again, the judi-
cial power entails exercising judgment to apply law to particular disputes;
interpreting the meaning of law to ascertain its best, fairest, and correct
meaning; and, when multiple sources of law conflict, privileging higher-
185. Jurists and academics recognize a difference between “facial challenges”
and “as-applied challenges.”  There is ongoing debate about the meaning and ap-
propriateness of those labels.  Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitu-
tional Decision Rules Versus Invalidating Statutes in Toto, 98 VA. L. REV. 301, 307–17
(2012); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1005 (2011); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1209 (2010); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges
and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000); Henry P. Monaghan, Over-
breadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3, 8–12 (1981).  For the purposes of this Article, any
distinction is irrelevant: courts apply the rational basis test to both types of
challenges.
186. For this Article, it is unnecessary to dwell on the precise remedy appro-
priate when a lower-order law conflicts with a higher-order law.  Although it is
commonly understood that courts can “strike down” statutes, that characterization
of judicial power has been questioned. See generally, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Con-
sumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2219–20 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-Of-Erasure Fallacy, 104
VA. L. REV. 933 (2018).
187. See supra Section II.C.  I stress again that the Supremacy Clause does not
merely establish primacy of federal law over state law.  It also establishes a hierar-
chy among different sources of federal law.
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order law over lower-order law.188  To that end, when a party claims that a
conflict exists between a lower-order law (state or federal statute) and a
higher-order law (U.S. Constitution), a court must determine whether a
conflict actually exists.  To determine whether a conflict exists, the court
logically must first know what both sources of law mean.  It is not possible
to say that laws conflict if their respective meanings are not known.  (This
is analogous to challenges to administrative rules.)  The first task in exer-
cising judicial power, then, includes ascertaining the best, fairest, and cor-
rect meaning of two sources.  Only then will the court be able to evaluate
them for actual conflict; and if conflict exists, the court will apply the
higher-order law and disregard the lower-order law.
Again building on the graphics used throughout this Article, the judi-
cial power envisions determining a line of correctness for both the Consti-
tution and the statute under review.  If the lines match, then no conflict





But if the lines of correctness deviate, then the judicial power and
duty instruct that the Constitution prevails.  (Figure G; compare with Fig-




This process may indeed be what happens in certain challenges to
statutes.  It does not, however, take place when courts apply the rational
basis test.
B. Rational Basis and the Zone of Deference
I outlined the contours of the rational basis test above in Part I. In
Part III, I showed how Chevron deference manipulates and shifts the judi-
cial power and duty when a lower-order law (administrative rule) allegedly
188. See supra notes 12, 93–95 and accompanying text; see also Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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conflicts with a higher-order law (LOTUS-MIP).  Instead of exercising in-
dependent judgment in the interpretation of the law to ascertain the best,
fairest, “right answer, no matter how closely balanced the question may
seem to be,”189 courts applying Chevron deference exercise only a portion
of the judicial power.
Something very similar happens under the rational basis test.  Just like
how Chevron deference offers a framework for interpreting statutes, the
rational basis test offers a framework for interpreting the Constitution.
Courts apply the test to review whether certain lower-order laws (state stat-
utes and federal statutes allegedly not made in pursuance) conflict with
higher-order law (U.S. Constitution).  And just like under Chevron, a court
applying the rational basis test exercises only a portion of the judicial
power.
Instead of establishing a line of correctness for both the lower-order
law (state or federal statute) and the higher-order law (U.S. Constitution),
the court sets a zone of deference for the higher-order law (U.S. Constitu-
tion).  Within that zone of deference resides the best, fairest, and correct
interpretation of the constitutional provision at issue, as well as all permis-
sible interpretations: in the words of the rational basis test, those interpre-
tations supporting enactments rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose.  But just because multiple statutes exist that are ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government purpose does not mean that
they are equally valid interpretations of the constitutional provision at is-
sue.190  Likewise, this does not mean that the constitutional line of cor-
rectness ceases to exist or that the judicial power stops being exercised just
because it stops being exercised by a court.  As Figure H shows (compare
to Figure D in the Chevron analogy, above), the court exercises judicial
power from the outset up to the zone of deference.  After that point, Congress
or the state legislature (as the case may be) then exercises the remnant
judicial power from the zone’s boundary up to that legislature’s substitute
line of correctness, thereby conclusively saying what the law is.  In other
words, especially when “‘ordinary commercial transactions’ are at issue,”
the Supreme Court has “made clear” that the rational basis test restricts its
exercise of judicial power to just up to the zone of deference, beyond
which a court must “defer[ ] to reasonable underlying legislative
judgments.”191
189. Scalia, supra note 95, at 520.
190. Id.
191. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 680 (2012) (quoting
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)).
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FIGURE H
Line of Correctness








Legislature exercising Judicial Power
In other words, a court applying the rational basis test, analogously to
a court applying Chevron deference, does not evaluate whether the lower-
order state or federal statute is consistent with or contrary to the best,
fairest, and correct interpretation of the higher-order Constitution (by
comparing their respective lines of correctness, as shown above in Figures
F and G).  It instead only goes so far as to determine whether the statute
lies within the zone of deference of the constitutional provision at issue.
Analogously to a court applying Chevron deference, a court applying the
rational basis test accepts Congress’s or the state legislature’s interpreta-
tion of the constitutional provision as controlling, even if it is not, in the
court’s view, the best, fairest, or correct interpretation.  The rational basis
test, analogously to Chevron deference, equates the constitutional line of
correctness with whatever the legislature enacted in the legislative pro-
cess—so long as the legislature did so within the zone of deference.  (Fig-
ure I; compare to Figure E in the Chevron analogy, above.)  Because the
legislature both writes the statute and dictates the substitute line of cor-






C. Constitutional Problems with Rational Basis Review of Federal Statutes
Article III vests the judicial power in courts, empowering them to “say
what the law is.”192  At the risk of repeating myself one too many times,
this means applying law in particular disputes; interpreting that law; and
192. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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doing so within a legal hierarchy implicating a duty to privilege higher-
order law over contrary lower-order law.193  Within the context of a partic-
ular dispute, the judicial power envisions courts ascertaining the best, fair-
est, and correct194 interpretation of a law, no matter its level in the
hierarchy, even if it is ambiguous or vague.  Under the rational basis test,
however, courts exercise only a small part of the judicial power.  Courts
still decide whether a federal or state statute rationally relates to a legiti-
mate government interest; they set the boundaries of the zone of defer-
ence.  Yet, just like with Chevron deference, “where in all this does a court
interpret the law”—particularly the Constitution—“and say what it is?”195
The remnant judicial power—that portion within the zone of defer-
ence up to the point of conclusively determining a constitutional provi-
sion’s meaning in a particular case—still exists.  But when applying the
rational basis test, courts do not exercise that remnant power.  Because the
judicial power and duty to say what the law is applies with equal force to
the Constitution as it does to statutes, the rational basis test parallels Chev-
ron deference as “no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of
the judicial duty.”196  As James McGoldrick has similarly observed, the ra-
tional basis test “has very little to do with rationality and everything to do
with judicial abdication.”197  Or, to put the quandary in Marbury’s terms,
the rational basis test limits a court’s exercise of judicial power, modifying
it from saying what the law is to saying what the law rationally or conceiva-
bly could be.  Rather than interpreting the constitutional provision at issue
up to the line of correctness and refusing to apply contrary lower-order
statutes not “made in pursuance,” courts using the rational basis test, anal-
ogously to courts applying Chevron deference, “render[ ] the precise coor-
dinates of the resulting legislative judgment virtually unreviewable.”198
Not only does the judiciary not exercise its full judicial power and
duty, it abdicates and transfers (or delegates) part of it.  In cases challeng-
ing federal statutes as contrary to the Constitution, the remnant judicial
power gets transferred to Congress.  Described as “deferential”—and
193. See supra Section II.B.
194. See supra notes 12, 93–95 and accompanying text.
195. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gor-
such, J., concurring).
196. Id.
197. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Separation of Powers Doctrine: Straining Out
Gnats, Swallowing Camels?, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 99–100 (1990).
198. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 316 (1993); see also id. at 323
n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[J]udicial review under the ‘conceivable set of facts’
test is tantamount to no review at all.”); McGoldrick, Jr., Retrospective, supra note 31,
at 752–53 (“The rational basis test as applied by the Supreme Court is such a per-
missive level of review that it is effectively not judicial review at all.”); Tara A.
Smith, A Conceivable Constitution: How the Rational Basis Test Throws Darts and Misses
the Mark, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 77, 98 (2017) (“Rational basis review exchanges the
rule of law for the rule of ‘close enough.’”).
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“enormously” so199—the rational basis test requires courts to defer to Con-
gress’s interpretation of the Constitution even if they would find a better,
fairer, or more correct reading.  As Justice Gorsuch has observed, “every
day, in courts throughout this country, judges manage with [their] tradi-
tional tools to reach conclusions about the meaning of statutes, rules of
procedure, contracts, and the Constitution.”200  Yet when evaluating a
challenge that a statute violates the Constitution—no less a core part of
the judicial power and duty than any of those other things a court does
“every day”—the rational basis test requires courts to treat Congress’s in-
terpretation “as controlling even when it is ‘not . . . the best one.’”201  Like
Chevron deference, the rational basis test forces judges to “lay aside” the
full scope of their judicial power and “declare affirmatively” that “the law is
what [Congress] says it is,”202 often simultaneously “abandon[ing] what
they believe is the best reading of” the Constitution.203  In short, with its
substitution of a zone of deference for a judicial line of correctness, the
rational basis test “wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative authority
to ‘say what the law is,’ and hands” over a large swath of that judicial power
and duty to Congress.204
The abdication and transfer of judicial power endemic to the rational
basis test rings dissonantly with Article III, which vests “every single drop”
of the judicial power in the courts, not in Congress.205  With “[t]he inter-
pretation of the laws” being “the proper and peculiar province of the
courts,”206 the Constitution provides no basis for the exercise of any judi-
cial power by Congress.  To once again quote Justice Story, “in cases where
[a court’s] own judgment shall differ from that of other high functiona-
ries,” the court “is not at liberty to surrender, or to waive” the judicial
power or its concomitant duty.207  Yet the rational basis test contravenes
these principles and violates the separation of powers.  Both the philo-
199. Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 401–02 (“The rational basis test is enor-
mously deferential to the government and only rarely has the Supreme Court in-
validated laws as failing rational basis review.”); see also Farrell, Equal Protection,
supra note 18, at 442 (“Equal protection’s rational basis review—the requirement
that a classification be rationally related to a permissible interest—is ordinarily a
very deferential standard.”).
200. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2430 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
201. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Decker v. Nw. Envt’l Def. Ctr., 568
U.S. 597, 613 (2013)). (Then-Judge Gorsuch, of course, was writing about
Chevron.)
202. Id. at 2440.
203. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomm’ns Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 983 (2005)).
204. Id. at 2712 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
205. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2190 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting);
see also supra note 160 and accompanying text.
206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 61, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton).
207. United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 162 (1841).
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sophical and historical background of the Constitution’s separation of
powers make that clear.
It is “striking” how much “intellectual background” supporting the
separation-of-powers doctrine “speaks directly to the separation of lawmak-
ing from law-exposition.”208  “Were [the judicial power] joined with the
legislative [power],” Montesquieu warned, “the life and liberty of the [citi-
zens] would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then
the legislator.”209  Writing much more recently, John Manning has ex-
plained that when legislative power is separate from both executive and
judicial power, “legislators must fear that the executor will apply bad laws
as written.”210  To that end, separation makes “it more difficult for
lawmakers to write bad laws and then spare themselves from the effects of
those laws through their control over the laws’ application.”211  Montes-
quieu and Manning are but two examples in a long line of concurrent
thought.212  By allowing Congress, the legislative branch of government,
to also exercise judicial power, the rational basis test contests and defies
this intellectual background.
What’s more, the rational basis test upends the historical significance
of tripartite structural separation, departing from a trajectory of liberalism
and reverting to a more primitive state of affairs.  In Ancient Rome,
“[w]hen any doubt arose upon the construction of the Roman laws, the
usage was to state the case to the emperor in writing, and take his opinion
upon it.”213  Decrying this ancient practice as “certainly a bad method of
interpretation,” Blackstone argued that “[t]o interrogate the legislature to
decide particular disputes is not only endless, but affords great room for
208. Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 60, at 645–48.
209. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6, 173 (Batoche Books ed.,
2011) (1748).
210. Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 60, at 647.
211. Id. at 646; see also id. at 647 (“Under a regime of separation, if legislators
wish to exempt themselves or their supporters from the effects of a law, the exemp-
tion must clearly appear in the legislation, where it will subject the legislators more
readily to public accountability.”).
212. See supra notes 56–79 and accompanying text; Manning, Constitutional
Structure, supra note 60, at 647 (“[S]eparation of lawmaking from law-exposition
also limits arbitrary government by providing legislators an incentive to enact rules
that impose clear and definite limits upon governmental authority, rather than
adopting vague and discretionary grants of power.”); see also Robert H. Jackson,
Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 123 (1948) (“[L]egislation is shaped
by a majority . . . [b]ut when a ruling majority has put its commands in statutory
form . . . the interpretation of their fair meaning and their application to individ-
ual cases should be made by judges as independent of politics as humanly possible
. . . .”); BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *259 (“Were [the judicial power] joined with
the legislative, the life, liberty, and property, of the subject would be in the hands
of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be then regulated only by their own
opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of law; which, though legislators
may depart from, yet judges are bound to observe.”).
213. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *58.
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partiality and oppression.”214  Blackstone’s sentiment had long echoed in
English legal theory.  For example, John Sadler wrote in 1649 that “if
Lawmakers, be Judges, of Those that break their Laws; they seem to
judg[e] in their Own Causes.”215  By the time “Charles II returned to gov-
ern England [in 1660], all exponents of limited government supported
the doctrine of the separation of powers.”216  England, however, did not
enjoy a tripartite separation of powers; Parliament also served as the high-
est judicial court.  While English law recognized the judicial duty and judi-
cial review in general, the organization of English governmental bodies
foreclosed judicial review of Parliamentary acts.217
Anxiety over excessive legislative power continued in the early days of
independent America.218  One of the Framers’ most immediate fears
arose from their experience with colonial and early state legislatures.  Not-
ing a “powerful tendency” for legislatures to “absorb all power,”219
Madison feared that legislatures were “drawing all power into [their] im-
petuous vortex.”220  At the Constitutional Convention, Gouverneur Morris
“concurred in thinking the public liberty in greater danger from Legisla-
tive usurpations than from any other source.”221  For example, colonial
and early state legislatures before and during the Founding Era often
functioned as courts of equity and decided the merits of controversies be-
tween parties, causing significant consternation about power accumula-
tion and liberty deprivation.222
The Constitution’s tripartite separation of powers responded to the
perceived flaws of the English and early states’ governments.  In contrast
to the English organization, and as a direct response to it, the Constitu-
tion’s separation of judicial and legislative powers meant that even “the
ordinary courts”—not to mention the Supreme Court—“could not defer
to the decisions of any higher, legislative court.”223  Moreover, reacting to
excessive state legislative powers, and “[r]eacting to the perception that
legislatively dominated state courts had rendered arbitrary judgments
214. Id.; see Decker v. Nw. Envt’l Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, (2013) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
215. GWYN, supra note 60, at 54 (quoting JOHN SADLER, RIGHTS OF THE KING-
DOM; OR CUSTOMS OF OUR ANCESTORS 87 (1649)).
216. Id. at 64.
217. See supra notes 110–20 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
219. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73–74 (Max
Farrand ed. 1966) (July 21, 1787) (remarks of James Madison).
220. Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 914 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 61, at 309
(James Madison)).
221. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 76 (Max Farrand
ed. 1966) (July 21, 1787) (remarks of Gouverneur Morris).
222. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 914–15 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing John F.
Manning, Response, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1662 (2001)).
223. Hamburger, Judicial Duty, supra note 108, at 22.
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rather than judgments according to law,” the Constitution fully separated
the judicial power and gave federal judges constitutional tenure and salary
protections.224
With its near-complete abdication and transfer of the judicial power
and duty to Congress, the rational basis test results in Congress being the
reviewer of its own actions.  Congress, instead of the courts, exercises a
large portion of the judicial power to determine whether a statute is
“made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.  In short, Congress serves as a
judge in its own case (not the judge, because the courts still exercise judi-
cial power up to the zone of deference).  This effectively regresses to the
English model of incomplete separation, in which Parliament served both
as the legislator and as the high court, dually possessing both legislative
and judicial power.  Although the rational basis test does not formally
anoint Congress as the high court in the United States, it functionally does
so—and in turn, it also functionally enfeebles judicial review of federal
statutes.  When one considers the full history of how the U.S. Constitution
was a reaction to the English system,225 it is peculiar to see an effective
return to that system—without any textual change to the relevant constitu-
tional provisions.  And just as peculiarly, the rational basis test returns
Congress to a pre-Constitutional level of legislative power.  The separation
of powers was meant to constrain legislative excess; the rational basis test
encourages it—or at least does nothing to stop it.  It permits Congress to
“draw[ ] all power into [its] impetuous vortex.”226
By disturbing the constitutional separation of powers, the rational ba-
sis test threatens the liberty-safeguarding purpose that separation ad-
vances.227  Whereas separation “diffuses power the better to secure
liberty,”228 amalgamation centralizes power and threatens individual free-
dom.  Moreover, “Article III protects liberty not only through its role in
implementing the separation of powers, but also by specifying the defining
characteristics of Article III judges,” including, most prominently, their
tenure and salary protection.229  Members of Congress, as well as others
224. Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 60, at 642.  “As its text and
our precedent confirm, Article III is an ‘inseparable element of the constitutional
system of checks and balances’ that ‘both defines the power and protects the inde-
pendence of the Judicial Branch.’”  Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482–83 (2011)
(quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58
(1982) (plurality op.)); see also Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 915 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting);
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1872).
225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 61, at 480–89 (Alexander Hamilton).
226. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 914 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDER-
ALIST NO. 48, supra note 61, at 309 (James Madison)).
227. See supra Section II.A.
228. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
229. Stern, 564 U.S. at 483; see also Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690,
691–92 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Perez v.
Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 120 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); HAMBURGER, LAW, supra note 104, at 507–08.
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exercising Article I power, by design have no such protections, meaning
that when they exercise judicial power, they do so without Article III’s safe-
guards.  Even if the rational basis test’s transfer of power and compromise
of structural separation might not constitute “the very definition of tyr-
anny,”230 it no doubt raises many of the general concerns that prompted
the Constitution’s tripartite division of powers in the first instance231—in
the very same way that Chevron deference’s transfer of power to the execu-
tive branch does.
In addition, just like how the executive branch’s interpretations can
constitutionally serve as evidence of statutory meaning,232 so too can Con-
gress’s interpretations serve as evidence of constitutional meaning.  By argu-
ing that the rational basis test is unconstitutional, I do not intend to imply
that Congress can or should play no role in constitutional interpretation.
Madison, for example, famously envisioned that liquidation of constitu-
tional meaning would take place over time with input from all three
branches.233  And because all legislators and officers take oaths to uphold
the Constitution, it makes sense to presume that they intend to act consti-
tutionally.  When Congress enacts a statute, for instance, it does so with its
own understanding that the statute is constitutional.
Under Madison’s vision, though, other branches operate on their
own interpretations of the Constitution only up until a particular case re-
quires a judicial test of that branch’s interpretation.  Madisonian liquida-
tion is not in tension with full exercise of judicial power by the courts.
The question of whether lower-order law (a statute) is consistent with
higher-order law (the Constitution) in a particular case calls for the exercise
of judicial power and duty.  And the rational basis test is deployed in partic-
ular cases, where only the judicial power is implicated.  Like Chevron defer-
ence, the core problem with the rational basis test is not deference per se,
but binding deference to a political branch’s interpretation of higher-order
law in a particular case.  “Although Congress’ expression of the view that it
does have power . . . is entitled to the most respectful consideration by the
judiciary,” Justice Harlan once wrote, “this cannot displace the duty of
[the] Court to make an independent determination whether Congress has
exceeded its powers.”234
Besides the separation-of-powers violation outlined immediately
above, the rational basis test raises two other related concerns.  First, a
court applying the rational basis test will uphold and apply a statute if
“there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a ra-
230. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 61, at 298 (James Madison).
231. See supra Section II.A.
232. See supra notes 171–74 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 102.
234. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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tional basis for” the statute.235  In many circumstances, those “conceiva-
ble” “facts” are ginned up in litigation by executive-branch lawyers
defending the constitutionality of the statute.236  When they accept an ex-
ecutive-branch official’s “conceivable” “facts” in this manner to aid in their
interpretation of law, courts do not merely accept one advocate’s position
over another’s.  They rather burke any independent search for truth, abdi-
cate judicial power, and arguably violate the separation of powers.
Second, Clark Neily has argued that in applying the rational basis test,
courts do not exercise judicial power in any way when applying the ra-
tional basis test.  Rather, he argues, courts exercise some other peculiar
power not contemplated by Article III:
The rational basis test at least arguably presents separation-of-
powers concerns as well, because it involves judges exercising a
power that Article III of the Constitution does not bestow upon
them. . . .  Consistent with modern notions of what does (and
does not) constitute a truly adjudicative proceeding,  Blackstone
defined the “judicial power” as the power “to examine the truth
of the fact, to determine the law arriving upon that fact, and, if
any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain and by its of-
ficers to apply the remedy.” . . .  [T]he defining essence of the
modern rational basis test is its lack of concern for “the truth of
the fact”—that is, the government’s true ends in restricting the
exercise of liberty or in distributing benefits and burdens un-
equally among individuals.  As a result, a judge who applies that
version of the rational basis test is no more exercising “the judi-
cial power” than a judge who presides over a trial by combat or
decides cases by tossing a coin.237
Finally, by abdicating a large portion of their judicial power and duty,
courts applying the rational basis test also upend the Supremacy Clause’s
legal hierarchy.  The Constitution indisputably ranks above federal stat-
utes not “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.  Yet by permitting fed-
eral statutes to pass without the full scrutiny required by the judicial
duty—regardless of whether a proper discharge of that duty would ulti-
235. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); see also supra
note 28 and accompanying text.
236. See Neily, Litigation, supra note 7, at 546–47 (citing Powers v. Harris, 379
F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2004); then citing Burke Mountain Acad., Inc. v. United
States, 715 F.2d 779, 783 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also Neily, No Such Thing, supra note 4,
at 913 (“[T]he rational basis test permits—perhaps encourages—government law-
yers and witnesses to misrepresent facts and distort reality; it destroys the principal
of judicial neutrality by conscripting judges to act as advocates for the government;
it turns a blind eye to corruption; it saddles plaintiffs with a logically impossible
burden of proof; and it is often deliberately misapplied in order to achieve a pre-
ferred result.”).
237. Neily, Litigation, supra note 7, at 552 (footnote omitted) (first quoting
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2; then quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*25).
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mately uphold or strike down the statute—the courts dishonor the
Supremacy Clause’s text and objective.  Analogously to when they apply
Chevron deference, courts applying the rational basis test simultaneously
diminish the elevated status of the Constitution and illegitimately lift the
status of statutes not made in pursuance.  How far each of those deviations
goes may depend on the particular case; but if different levels of legal
hierarchy end up in equipoise, the Constitution is violated.  The rational
basis test, in other words, disregards the Supremacy Clause’s hierarchy by
placing all procedurally proper statutes—not just LOTUS-MIP—on par
with the Constitution.  Although some scholars believe the contrary, the
text of the Supremacy Clause reveals that “made in Pursuance” requires
both procedural and substantive compliance.238  But the rational basis test
effectively reduces “made in Pursuance” to a procedural-compliance re-
quirement only.
The effect of the Supremacy Clause violation, for federal statutes, is
not merely one of form.  Bradford Clark has argued persuasively that the
Supremacy Clause constrains federal power by requiring the political
branches—and particularly Congress—to conform their acts to constitu-
tional requirements.239  The Supremacy Clause, however, neither self-exe-
cutes nor exists in a vacuum.  It is part of a Constitution that creates a
tripartite separation of powers with an independent judiciary vested with
the whole judicial power.  That judicial power comes with the duty to say
what the law is—its best, fairest, and correct meaning—and to privilege
higher-order law above lower-order law.  “[J]udicial review under the
Supremacy Clause reinforces the constitutional separations of powers” by
“prevent[ing] Congress from authoritatively judging the scope of its own
powers.”240 Thus, courts can uphold the Constitution’s protections—in-
cluding the liberty-safeguarding structural separation of powers—only if
they honor both the judicial power and Supremacy Clause.  On the other
hand, by “limit[ing] themselves to rational basis scrutiny of federal stat-
utes,” courts currently “surrender[ ] to Congress one of their essential
functions under the Supremacy Clause.”241
The Supremacy Clause completes the analogy between the Chevron
critique and my critique of the rational basis test.  Both critiques locate a
problem in courts—vested with the full judicial power—abdicating and
transferring that power to a political branch.  The meaning of the judicial
power under Article III does not change depending on what type of legal
text a court is applying or interpreting.  Likewise, a court’s duty to decide
in accord with higher-law and to forego applying contrary lower-order law
is the same in all cases, too.  The Supremacy Clause’s legal hierarchy
makes clear that the following legal relationships all bear the same hierar-
238. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
239. See generally Clark, supra note 123.
240. Id. at 112.
241. Id. at 124.
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chical relationship: U.S. Constitution to federal statute not made in pursu-
ance; U.S. Constitution to contrary state law;242 LOTUS-MIP to contrary
administrative rule.  The separation of powers, the meaning of judicial
power, and the Supremacy Clause all work in tandem.  Applied here, their
principles render both Chevron deference and the rational basis test consti-
tutionally problematic.
D. Constitutional Problems with Rational Basis Review of State Statutes
The central theme of my critique of rational basis review of federal
statutes applies equally to rational basis review of state statutes: by erecting
a zone of deference, courts abdicate a large part of their judicial power
and duty, transferring that abdicated remnant to another governmental
actor.  Despite that core similarity, rational basis review of state statutes
does not raise the same separation-of-powers problems raised by rational
basis review of federal statutes.243  When used to review federal statutes,
the rational basis test leads to transfer of remnant judicial power from
courts to another federal branch (Congress).  When used to review state
statutes, by contrast, the rational basis test results in transfer of remnant
judicial power from the federal courts to a state legislature.  Although
transferring judicial power from federal courts to the federal legislature
might be analogous to transferring judicial power from federal courts to
state legislatures (insofar as both Congress and state legislatures are both
legislative bodies), that is all it is—an analogy.  As traditionally under-
stood, the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers does not govern rela-
tions between the federal government and state governments.  When it
comes to state statutes, then, no formal separation-of-powers doctrine ac-
tually condemns the rational basis test’s transfer of federal judicial power.
Yet when dealing with state statutes, federal courts’ abdication of judi-
cial power and duty is still not without consequence.  Just like with Chevron
deference and with rational basis review of federal statutes, rational basis
review of state statutes results in transfer of judicial power.  By transferring
federal judicial power to states, the rational basis test transfers federal sover-
eign power to a different sovereign—a state.244  In other words, the trans-
242. See supra Section II.C; infra Section IV.D.
243. This Article addresses only the rational basis test as used by federal
courts.  Just like federal courts, though, many state courts also use the rational
basis test (or something very close to it) to review state and local government ac-
tion under state constitutional provisions.  And most state constitutions feature
separation-of-powers principles similar to those found in the U.S. Constitution.
Depending on state law, then, the separation-of-powers concerns raised above may
also apply, by analogy, to state constitutional law.  Put differently, it violates the
federal constitutional separation of powers for a federal court to use the rational
basis test to review federal governmental action; it may also violate a given state’s
constitutional separation of powers for a court of that state to use the rational basis
test to review state or local governmental action.
244. This inter-sovereign transfer of power finds no justification in principles
of federalism. See infra notes 266–71 and accompanying text.  Moreover, no less
than members of Congress, state actors lack the tenure, salary, and other indepen-
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fer is problematic not because it is inter-branch but because it is inter-
sovereign.245
Although “under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty
concurrent with that of the Federal Government,” they do so “subject
. . . to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause.”246  Whereas the
Supremacy Clause’s role in constraining federal power has been ques-
tioned (particularly with respect to the difference I draw between federal
statutes not made in pursuance and LOTUS-MIP, a distinction necessary
to support my argument),247 the Supremacy Clause’s role in constraining
state power (and elevating federal law above contrary state law) has always
been accepted as blackletter.248  The Supremacy Clause requires state
judges to obey federal supreme law “notwithstanding” state law “to the
Contrary,” thereby elevating supreme law—including the U.S. Constitu-
tion and LOTUS-MIP—above contrary state constitutions and statutes.  In
setting forth this hierarchy, the Supremacy Clause “upholds the written
Constitution as the highest form of federal law”249 and offers further tex-
tual support for the discharge of judicial duty.  By defying the Supremacy
Clause, the rational basis test delinks judicial review of state statutes from
constitutional text.  And by permitting state statutes to pass without the
full scrutiny required by the judicial duty—regardless of whether a proper
exercise of that duty would ultimately uphold or strike down the statute—
courts denigrate the Supremacy Clause’s text and objective.  Just like ra-
tional basis review of federal statutes, and analogously to Chevron defer-
ence, rational basis review of state statutes lowers the elevated status of the
Constitution and improperly raises the status of state statutes.
dence protections conferred on federal courts and judges by Article III. See supra
notes 227–31 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 166–70 and accompany-
ing text.
245. As explained above, abdication and transfer of power from one federal
branch to another not only violates the separation-of-powers, but also constitutes
unauthorized subdelegation and divestment. See supra note 164.  Those concerns
ring just as true here, where a federal branch, vested with power initially belonging
to the People, purports to unilaterally transfer that power to another actor (in this
case, a state).
246. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
247. See supra note 123; see also, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); Clark, supra note 123, at 92–115; Jesse H. Choper,
The Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86
YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Kramer, supra note 123; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics
Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 243 (2000).
248. For example, although no ambassador of scrutinizing judicial review,
Herbert Weschler reasoned that the “prime function envisaged for judicial re-
view—in relation to federalism—was the maintenance of national supremacy
against nullification or usurpation by the individual states, the national govern-
ment having no part in their composition or their councils.”  Herbert Wechsler,
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selec-
tion of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559 (1954).
249. Clark, supra note 123, at 113–14 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI).
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This constitutional problem intensifies when one considers how most
constitutional challenges to state statutes arise under the Fourteenth
Amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in the aftermath
of the Civil War to stymie state governments from violating the civil liber-
ties of freed slaves and white Republicans, to ensure the constitutionality
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and to combat the notorious and discrimi-
natory “Black Codes.”250  Whatever the original Constitution established
as the framework for inter-sovereign relations, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment completely refigured it, elevating the status of federal rights and re-
stricting state power in the face of those rights.  Unlike before its
ratification, the Fourteenth Amendment gave the federal government di-
rect authority to limit excessive and distorted state power; the Amendment
was designed to be, and textually is, a limitation on state power.  Coupled
with the Supremacy Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment rejects the ra-
tional basis test’s systematically deferential stance toward state power.  Es-
pecially in challenges against state statutes under the Fourteenth
Amendment, rational basis review hardly seems consistent with either that
Amendment or the Supremacy Clause, both of which patently establish
the primacy of federal law—and particularly the federal Constitution.
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS
In this Part, I anticipate and respond to the most obvious counter-
arguments to my argument.
First, one could argue that the Chevron analogy is inapposite. Chevron
deference involves abdication of judicial power and transfer of that power
to the executive branch, specifically to administrative agencies.  Part of the
reason that the transfer under Chevron is problematic, the argument goes,
is that the judicial power ends up in the hands of unelected agency heads
and bureaucrats.  The deference, in other words, is to unaccountable of-
ficers.  By contrast, the rational basis test, despite its abdication and trans-
fer of judicial power, transfers that power to Congress or state legislatures.
The remnant power ends up in the hands of elected federal or state legisla-
tors.  The deference is to officers directly accountable to the people.
Although observant, this argument does not actually address the core
separation-of-powers and Supremacy Clause concerns I raise.  A critical
premise of my argument is that Article III’s Vesting Clause vests the fed-
eral judicial power in the federal courts—not elsewhere.  The constitu-
tional violation arises upon transfer of power, whether that transfer be to
the executive branch, Congress, or state legislatures.
Moreover, this argument ignores history to justify transfer of judicial
power under the rational basis test on the grounds that Congress is
elected.  It was their early experience with elected state legislatures that
250. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1320–31
(3d ed. 2000); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 26–56 (1986);
Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 116–17 (2011).
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caused the Framers to fear majoritarian tyranny and the “impetuous vor-
tex” of legislative power251—and prompted them to respond by imple-
menting a tripartite separation of powers and by giving federal judges
independence, tenure, and salary protection.
Second, one may question the Chevron analogy on other grounds.
Courts using Chevron deference, this argument proceeds, examine the text
of two sources of law: a LOTUS-MIP and a federal administrative rule.
When the former is ambiguous, courts defer to the executive branch.
Chevron is thus an interstitial test triggered in such challenges, and it exists
independently of the text of the higher-order LOTUS-MIP.  By contrast,
the rational basis test is not an independent, interstitial test but rather an
interpretation or construction of a particular constitutional provision (say,
the Due Process Clause).  Under this argument, the rational basis test de-
pends on and simply implements the text of the Due Process Clause.  This
argument fails.
Just like Chevron deference, the rational basis test does not purport to
interpret the text of any substantive higher-order law. Chevron itself has
nothing to do with the text of the Clean Air Act, for example; it is a tool
courts use when interpreting various federal statutes, including the Clean
Air Act.  The rational basis test likewise bears no relation to the text of the
Due Process Clause (or any constitutional provision); it is rather an inde-
pendent, interstitial tool courts use when interpreting higher-order consti-
tutional provisions.
We know this, in part, because courts do not limit their use of the
rational basis test to the Due Process Clause (or any single constitutional
provision).  Courts use it when parties challenge lower-order statutes
under any number of constitutional provisions, including the Commerce
Clause, the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.252  Because those various constitutional provisions differ in
text and substance, one cannot seriously maintain that the rational basis
test is a textual interpretation—much less the best, fairest, and correct
interpretation—of any one of them.  That courts rely on the rational basis
test when analyzing so many different constitutional challenges indicates
that, just like Chevron, it exists independently of the text of any higher-
order law.
We also know that the rational basis test is an independent, interstitial
tool because even with respect to a single constitutional provision (say,
again, the Due Process Clause), courts do not always look to the rational
basis test.  Sometimes courts employ a different test, such as strict scrutiny.
251. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 61, at 309 (James Madison); see also
Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 914–15 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Stern v.
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482–84 (2011); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
128, 146 (1872); 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 290–91 (1788); supra note 64 and accompany-
ing text.
252. See supra notes 44–55 and accompanying text.
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If the rational basis test were simply what the text of a particular constitu-
tional provision required, then courts would use it uniformly.
To be sure, the specific analysis a court writes down in a Chevron case
might look slightly different from the analysis in a rational basis case.  But
that is due to the sheer number of federal statutes compared to constitu-
tional provisions.  When entertaining a statutory challenge to a federal ad-
ministrative rule, courts usually begin with a fairly thorough analysis of the
higher-order LOTUS-MIP before implementing Chevron deference; they
do so to determine whether Chevron deference is appropriate and because
there is often little binding precedent about the specific statutory provi-
sion at issue.  When entertaining a constitutional challenge to a statute,
however, federal courts often can simply cite precedent that has already
taken the analysis of the higher-order constitutional provision to the point
of determining that the rational basis test is appropriate.  In other words,
Chevron courts must first analyze the statute up to the zone of deference, be-
cause no binding case has done so before.  But many courts have already
interpreted constitutional provisions up to the zone of deference, so
courts need not “show their work” in as great of detail.  (This is not invari-
ably the case, of course, as courts often spill much ink deciding whether
the rational basis test or some more scrutinous test is appropriate.)
So, in both Chevron and rational basis cases, courts begin with a sub-
stantive higher-order law (LOTUS-MIP in Chevron; constitutional provision
for rational basis review); employ a deferential interstitial test that exists
independently of the text and substance of that higher-order law (Chevron;
rational basis test); and then spit out conclusions about the challenged
lower-order provision based on that deference (federal regulation; federal
or state statute).  If anything, courts employing the rational basis test (as
compared to courts employing Chevron deference) further distance them-
selves from the actual text and substance of the higher-order law at issue,
which in turn leads to an even greater abdication and transfer of judicial
power and duty.
Third, one might criticize my argument as extending beyond the ra-
tional basis test and applying to nearly all judicial review (i.e., review not
using the rational basis test).  I must share, first off, that I intend for my
argument to apply only to rational basis review of federal and state stat-
utes.  I do not intend to opine on the constitutionality of the strict-scrutiny
test, the intermediate-scrutiny test, or any other test any court has devel-
oped to review the constitutionality of a government act.  Any such investi-
gation is beyond the scope of this Article.  That said, the background
principles of constitutional law discussed in this Article—separation of
powers, the meaning of judicial power, the judicial duty, and the
Supremacy Clause’s legal hierarchy—are broadly applicable.  They un-
doubtedly extend beyond my argument.  What I have said about those
background principles may form an appropriate starting point for evaluat-
ing other constitutional questions.
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Fourth, one might attempt to justify the rational basis test by citing
the traditional standard for declaring lower-order law void or unenforce-
able in a particular case.  As explained, the judicial power and duty re-
quires courts to acknowledge legal hierarchy and to privilege higher-order
law over contrary lower-order law.253  Traditionally, higher-order law was
held to displace lower-order law only when a “clear” or “irreconcilable”
conflict existed between the two sources.254  In historic English practice,
for example, “the higher law displaced the lesser obligation only if the
contradiction were manifest.”255  “That standard continued to be the one
embraced by the exercise of judicial power” during the Founding Era and
long after.256  Under the reasonable basis test used in the late 1800s and
early 1900s,257 the “reviewing court was not to declare . . . the legislative
enactment unconstitutional except in a ‘clear case.’”258
Whatever its merits or its constitutionality when viewed in isolation,
this standard of clarity does not justify the rational basis test.  Unlike the
rational basis test, requiring “clear” or “irreconcilable” conflict still envi-
sions that courts exercise the full judicial power.  Courts still need to ascer-
tain the best, fairest, and correct interpretation of both the higher-order
law and the lower-order law and then compare those sources.  This is dif-
ferent in kind from the rational basis test, under which courts abdicate
and transfer part of the judicial power to a different actor to interpret the
higher-order law.
Fifth, one might contend that my argument supports judicial
supremacy259 run amok.  To be sure, my argument assumes that courts
253. See supra Section II.B.
254. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 61, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton).
That is, the judicial power and duty supports holding a state or federal statute void
or unenforceable only if it is at “irreconcilable variance” with the Constitution. Id.
255. John O. McGinnis, Reforming Constitutional Review of State Economic Legisla-
tion, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 522–23 (2016) [hereinafter McGinnis, Re-
forming] (citing HAMBURGER, LAW, supra note 104, at 309).
256. Id.
Cases involving state judicial review before the Federal Constitution, com-
ments in the debates over the Federal Constitution, federal judicial deci-
sions in the pre-Marshall Court era, federal judicial decisions in the
Marshall Court era, and state judicial decisions involving state constitu-
tions after the framing of the Federal Constitution all followed a similar
standard.
Id. (citing John O. McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843,
876–95 (2016)).
257. See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text.
258. Jackson, Classical, supra note 8, at 497 (quoting The Sinking Fund Cases,
99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878)).  I do not intend to suggest that returning to the reasona-
ble basis test either would or would not be constitutional.
259. Although the term “judicial supremacy” may be susceptible to any num-
ber of definitions, a fairly standard one comes from Erwin Chemerinsky—“that the
Supreme Court should be viewed as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitu-
tion and that we should deem its decisions as binding on the other branches and
levels of government, until and unless constitutional amendment or subsequent
decision overrules them.”  Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Supremacy, 58
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have authority to conclusively determine constitutional meaning in particu-
lar cases.  But that position merely restates the judicial power and duty; it
does not reflect expansive judicial supremacy.  Indeed, it is generally rec-
ognized that federal courts are the final arbiter of the Constitution’s
meaning, at least within the confines of particular cases.260  Drawing on
the Supremacy Clause and the judicial power, the Supreme Court has de-
clared “that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution.”261  This “basic principle” “has ever since been respected
by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature
of our constitutional system.”262  Moreover, just because a court in a par-
ticular case determines that a statute is contrary to the Constitution does
not mean the court is legislating generally applicable rules of conduct.  At
most, the court is negating, and “judicial negation is not legislation”263:
If Congress refuses to enact a statute, perhaps because in its opin-
ion it would be unconstitutional, it does not matter if a court
would uphold it as constitutional.  Courts cannot mandate the
passage of a statute.  On the issue of which statutes to enact the
legislative power the legislature is “supreme.”  Only if the Con-
gress enacts a measure because enough of its members believe it
to be constitutional (or do not care) and the president signs the
bill believing it is constitutional (or does not care) may the Court
have the opportunity to express its opinion on its constitutional-
ity.  A court’s power to negate unconstitutional legislation ren-
ders it equal, not superior, to the other branches.264
Put differently, Congress, the executive branch, and the states certainly
may interpret the Constitution when exercising their respective powers.
But a federal court’s interpretation is authoritative when that interpreta-
tion emerges from an exercise of judicial power.265
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1459, 1450 (2017).  For purposes of this Article, I neither
endorse nor object to this definition or to the principle it embodies.  Rather, in
this paragraph of text, I simply clarify that accepting my argument about the ra-
tional basis test does not require one to also endorse an expansive notion of judicial
supremacy.
260. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
261. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); see supra note 102 and accompa-
nying text.
262. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
263. Barnett, Judicial Power, supra note 119, at 133; see also supra note 186.
264. Barnett, Judicial Power, supra note 119, at 133.  Indeed, “the original
meaning of the ‘judicial power’ in Article III, included the power of judicial nullifi-
cation.” Id. at 117; see also Prakash & Yoo, supra note 119.
265. See Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State
and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 661–62 (2000) (Although
“[o]ther branches of government and the citizenry at large may have opinions
about constitutional meaning,” the Supreme Court “has a privileged role in consti-
tutional interpretation.”); see also Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial
Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 367–68 (1997).
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Sixth, one might argue that the rational basis test is supported or even
required by the separation of powers or by federalism.  Supreme Court
justices as ideologically diverse as Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel Al-
ito have suggested as much.266  Along similar lines, the Beach Court posi-
tively described the rational basis test as “a paradigm of judicial
restraint.”267  As mentioned, similar arguments have been advanced in
support of Chevron.268  When higher-order law contains ambiguity, the ar-
gument goes, resolving that ambiguity requires a political branch to make
policy judgments.269  Although this entire Article exposes the weaknesses
of this counterargument, a few additional words are warranted.
This counterargument fails to distinguish between deference to policy
judgment and deference to interpretation of law.  Abdication and transfer
of judicial power and duty—i.e., deference to other-branch interpretation
of law, or saying what the law is, in a particular case—differs from defer-
ence to policy judgment.  Determining whether a lower-order law (statute)
266. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 813 (2013) (Alito, J., dissent-
ing) (“[I]n rational basis cases . . . ‘the courts have been very reluctant, as they
should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers,
to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those
interests should be pursued.’” (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1985))); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 383–84 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting same passage from Cleburne).
As one scholar has lamented, the rational basis test “affirmatively shuns reasoned
analysis in the name of federalism and separation of powers.”  Susannah W.
Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 743 (2014).
267. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993).  For an interest-
ing discussion about “judicial restraint” and how different political contingencies
have wavered from embracing it to rejecting it, see Jack M. Balkin, Why Liberals and
Conservatives Flipped on Judicial Restraint: Judicial Review in the Cycles of Constitutional
Time, 98 TEX. L. REV. 215 (2019). See generally DAMON ROOT, OVERRULED: THE
LONG WAR FOR CONTROL OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2014); Joseph S. Diedrich,
Article III, Judicial Restraint, and This Supreme Court, 72 S.M.U. L. REV. 235 (2019).
268. See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text.
269. See id.  This argument is often phrased in terms of institutional compe-
tence: “Sometimes it is argued that the Court should defer to legislatures on eco-
nomic issues because they have a superior capacity to determine social facts, like
the effects of legislation on health and safety.”  McGinnis, Reforming, supra note
255, at 522 (citing Garrett, 531 U.S. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Unlike courts,
Congress can readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess the magnitude of
the problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Asserting that “this claim is wrong,” John McGinnis has argued:
As an elected body, Congress is designed to respond to its constituents’
subjective desires, not to the objective facts of the world, and it is subject
to interest group pressure.  In contrast, the judiciary is relatively insulated
from the preferences of constituents and less subject to partisan bias and
interest group pressure. Its salient institutional structure is the adversarial
proceeding where each side has incentives to scrutinize relentlessly the
factual claims of its opponent. Accordingly, the judiciary would appear to
be at least as good, if not a superior, fact-finder, both because of its insti-
tutional capacity and because of its relative lack of bias.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging
Facts Like Law: The Courts v. Congress in Social Fact-Finding, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69,
94–110 (2008).
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is consistent with or contrary to a higher-order law (Constitution) is a
question of law to be answered by exercising the judicial power and duty.
It is not a question of policy, and courts should not abdicate their duty in
the name of avoiding making policy judgments.  On the other hand, de-
termining what actions to take within the constitutional scope of authority
is a matter of policy for the political branches, not a question of law to be
scrutinized and answered by courts exercising judicial power.  Put differ-
ently, once Congress or a state legislature has made a policy judgment and
enacted a statute, it remains an exercise of judicial power, within the con-
text of a particular dispute, to determine whether that statute is consistent
with or contrary to higher law.270  Although a court may not substitute a
different policy judgment, it still has the power and duty to say whether
the statute conflicts with the Constitution.  The Constitution dictates what
Congress and the states may do—not the other way around; Congress and
the states don’t get to say what the Constitution means in particular
cases.271  Neither the separation of powers nor federalism contemplates
abdication or transfer of judicial power in the name of deference or
restraint.
Seventh and finally, one might argue that I advocate for a return to
the Lochner era.  Not so.  To begin, my argument establishes only that the
existing rational basis test violates the Constitution; it does not prescribe
what should take its place.  True enough, the modern rational basis test
emerged as a reaction against the perceived missteps of the Supreme
Court in Lochner and contemporaneous cases.272  Yet just because the
modern rational basis test is unconstitutional does not imply that Lochner-
era jurisprudence was constitutionally sound.  Further, my argument re-
lates only to the judicial test for evaluating constitutionality—not to
outcomes.
Relatedly, some might contend that if the rational basis test is indeed
unconstitutional, then whatever test replaces it would scrutinize legislation
more strictly.  And because most statutes reviewed under the rational basis
test concern economic matters, a stricter test would elevate the status of
economic rights.273  Although some might object to this elevation on pol-
icy grounds, it remains true that no non-economic rights would be deni-
grated or demoted.  Rights need not be a zero-sum game.  Federal courts
270. See Barnett, Judicial Power, supra note 119, at 133.
271. Relatedly, one might argue that the rational basis test reduces conflict
between branches “by reducing the number of cases in which the judiciary pro-
vides an honest assessment of the other branches’ handiwork.”  Neily, Litigation,
supra note 7, at 556.  Even if inter-branch conflict might be undesirable in some
ways, the separation of powers envisions that each branch will monitor the others
to preserve limits on power and to foster individual liberty.  The branches, in fact,
are often described as “co-equal.”  If courts set out to reduce inter-branch conflict,
however, they are likely to reduce their own power while simultaneously aggrandiz-
ing the power of Congress—thus disturbing co-equality.
272. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 17, at 564.
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can protect certain rights more strongly without compromising other
rights.
CONCLUSION
Departing from English and early state practice, the U.S. Constitution
establishes a tripartite separation of powers and an independent judiciary.
Article III vests federal courts—and no other branch—with the “judicial
power.”  This power entails applying law to decide particular disputes; in-
terpreting the law in order to apply it; and, in the face of multiple conflict-
ing sources of law, applying higher-order law and rendering lower-order
law void or unenforceable (at least in the particular case at hand).  On
that last point, the Supremacy Clause instructs that the U.S. Constitution
prevails over federal statutes not “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution
and over contrary state statutes.
When a party argues that a lower-order statute contravenes the Con-
stitution, courts often apply the rational basis test, which sanctions any
statute that rationally relates to a legitimate government interest.  In apply-
ing this test, however, courts abdicate part of their judicial power and duty.
Instead of exercising judicial power to ascertain the best, fairest, and cor-
rect interpretation of the constitutional provision at issue, they merely set
a zone of deference, within which all rational interpretations reside.  The
abdicated judicial power is effectively transferred to Congress or the state
legislature (as the case may be), which exercises the remnant judicial
power.  Instead of interpreting the Constitution to say what it means,
courts say only what it could mean, deferring to a legislature to fully ascer-
tain meaning.  When used to review a federal statute, this arrangement
violates the separation of powers.  And when used to review any statute, it
subverts the Supremacy Clause’s established legal hierarchy, elevating the
status of lower-level statutes and, accordingly, devaluing the Constitution.
Chevron deference and the well-known separation-of-powers argument
against it provide an apt analogy that bolsters my claims.  When a party
challenges an administrative rule (lower-order law) as contrary to an am-
biguous higher-order law (LOTUS-MIP), the legal hierarchy is once again
implicated.  Yet just like with the rational basis test, courts applying Chev-
ron deference fail to fully exercise the judicial power or discharge the judi-
cial duty.  Instead, they merely set a zone of deference, upholding and
applying the lower-order administrative rule so long as it permissibly or
reasonably construes the higher-order statute.  Just like with the rational
basis test, this framework undermines the separation of powers and the
Supremacy Clause.  But unlike with the rational basis test, the separation-
of-powers problems with Chevron deference have been well-documented.  I
assert, however, that anyone who accepts such arguments against Chevron
must, by extension, accept that the rational basis test fails for the same
reason.
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Article III provides that courts have the “judicial power” to decide
particular cases, and as Chief Justice Marshall famously proclaimed in Mar-
bury, that power and “duty” entails “say[ing] what the law is.”274 Chevron
deference and the rational basis test both distort these constitutional im-
peratives.  Yet despite Chevron’s misstep, one cannot deny that in the con-
text of deciding particular cases, it is the “province and duty of the Judicial
Department”—not the executive branch—to “say what the law is”—not
what the law permissibly or reasonably might be, or what the executive
branch says it is.  And despite the rational basis test, it is still the “province
and duty of the Judicial Department”—not Congress, not state legisla-
tures—to “say what the [Constitution] is”—not what the Constitution ra-
tionally could be, or what Congress or a state legislature says it is.
In sum, the rational basis test is unconstitutional.  Others before me
have reached that same conclusion.275  In this Article, I have presented a
new theory explaining why: the test violates the structural separation of
powers and the Supremacy Clause.
274. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
275. See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text.
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